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GENDER DIFFERENCES AND
ARGUMENTATION:
A POSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE RECEPTION
OF GENETICS ARGUMENTS

Celeste M. Condit, Ph.D.
Melanie Williams, Doctoral Student
University of Georgia
The past decade has seen a revival of the old patriarchal idea that the
minds of men and women are fundamentally different. Cultural feminists led
the way back into this dark forest by arguing that women had different paths
of moral development from men (Gilligan, 1982) and different ways of
"knowing" the world (Belenky et al., 1986). The work of these feminists,
however, merely legitimated more recent studies focusing on the biological
differences between men's and women's minds that have recently been con
ducted by traditional biological scientists (e.g. Cur et al., 1995)and tbat have
since been widely popularized in the mass media (e.g. Begley, 1995; "Sex,"
1995). This essay argues against the application of such modes of analysis
to studies of gender and argumentation. Instead, it suggests that we should
employ positional accounts of gender differences in argumentation.' It makes
this argument in three steps. First, it briefly describes the two major flaws
undergirding extant gender difference arguments. Second, it describes an

alternative perspective based on the social and personal positioning of gen
dered humans, a perspective that emphasizes the search for gender diversity.
Third, it presents an audience-reception study of genetics arguments de
signed to illustrate the positional model.
Flaws in the Gender Difference Argument

A variety of scholars have pointed out the many flaws in those analyses
that have sought to demonstrate that the mental processes of men and wom
en are fundamentally different from each other (see especially Tavris, 1992).
For our purposes, these flaws can be reduced to two. First, these works em
phasize the differences between men and women and Ignore the range of
differences among persons within each gender grouping. The particular way
In which these studies dichotomize gender depends on whether the method
employed is scientific or feminist.
Those studies asserting gender dichotomy on the basis of scientific meth'Various usages of the terms "sex" and "gender" are employed by those from
different perspectives. Because cultural definitions are imposed upon biological fac
tors to cut up biological territories in various ways, to regulate their meanings, to
reshape biological components (through developmental training as well as surgery),
as well as to create unique cultural aspects of sexual identities, we use the term
gender as a superordlnate term designating both cultural facets of sex-related identities
as well as the culturally shaped biological substrate.

SPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 32, Nos. 1-4 (1995), 1-12.
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odologies reduce the range of scores for men and for women each to a
separate "mean" and then report the differences between these two means
as though this difference of mean was summative of a normative "male" and
normative "female" type. This method should be treated with great skepti
cism because in any set of complex statistical measures, one should expect
at least one out of 20 of the subquestions to show, by random chance, a
difference in mean if measured to a significance level of p < .05 (a fairly
standard significance level). Only strict replication could assure us that these
fishing expeditions have produced something other than random variance.
But, in general, these fishing expeditions are not replicated. The experiences
of scholars in communication studies suggest that reliable and valid repli
cation of gender dichotomy studies are highly difficult. Studies attempting to
verify gender dichotomy with respect to communication patterns have shown
more contradictory results than similar results (Pearson, Turner & Todd-Mancillas, 1991; Rakow, 1986).

Even if, however, replication produced any cases of reliable evidence of
gender difference in the means of "normal" male and female minds, such
studies have little substantive meaning, given the fact that on the overwhelm
ing number of features, there are no differences in means, and that withingroup difference exceeds across-group difference. In other words, the fact
that there are differences in the means of these two constructed population
distributions tells us little, especially when overlap in the two distributions is
as large as it is in all gender findings to date.
Those studies that assert gender dichotomy on the basis of feminist meth
odologies do not, of course, hold themselves accountable to such quantita
tive measures. Instead, they rely on the "experiences" and "interpretations"
of the authors, their research participants, and their audiences to confirm
their claims (Carter & Spitzack, 1989). Given that we are all already steeped
in sexist stereotypes, it is not surprising that research participants and re
searchers produce sex-stereotypical comments and interpretations and that
many people find these studies consonant with their experiences. In this
case, therefore, feminist methodologies relying on prior experiences are sub
ject to circular reasoning and therefore are highly suspect.
The second basic flaw in studies seeking to establish gender dichotomy is
that they continue to believe that they can parse out some kind of funda
mental biological component of differences in human behavior that is sep
arate from cultural influences. This is obviously not possible when one stud
ies adult human physiology. As we well know now, brains develop in re
sponse to external stimuli, so that differences in the brains of two sets of
twenty year olds are as likely to be accounted for by their exposure to dif
ferent stimuli and rewards as to be accounted for by gender genetics. Given
that gender difference in social treatment begins as soon as a child is given
a name, this socialization component cannot be parsed from the biological
component after birth. Even if, on the other hand, we analyze differences in
brains of newborns (an ethically problematic procedure, since the newborns
cannot give informed consent), we have no idea whether measured differ
ences in biological means (which still suffer from the problems described
above) translate into any specific social differences. The turn to biology as a
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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proof of differences in the cognitive capacities or styles of men and women
is, therefore, inherently insupportable.
Alternative Treatments of Gender

Gender deconstructivists and those who have studied the interactions of

race, class, and gender have urged us to take a different approach to gender
(Butler, 1990; Houston, 1992; Moi, 1985/1991; Stanback, 1989). Instead of

emphasizing the differences between the groups "men" and "women",these
scholars have suggested the need to explore the differences within genders,
even blurring the lines between genders. They have argued that there are a
variety of rich subtypes of gender, including but also transcending those re
lated to sexual orientation. There are, as our common sense would aver, both
nurturing, quiet "feminine" men and bossy, independent "masculine" wom

en. Bem (1981), for example, has suggested that there are four genders:
"masculine," "feminine," "neuter," and "androgynous." The gender deconstructivist approach urges us to explore these and other different groupings
as valid types of human beings, rather than dismissing them as deviants who
stray from the sex role stereotypes summed up in means of gendered behav
ior. In place of a model of gender dichotomy, it offers a model of gender
diversity.
A few empirical studies have moved us in that direction (Houston, 1985).

However, by and large, gender deconstructivists have not been empirically
oriented. They are more concerned to endorse and encourage a range of
gender differences than to test whether such groupings might exist or to
categorize them through careful observational studies. To respond to this gap,
the study here reported offers an empirical exploration of within-gender dif
ference and examines the impact of those internal differences upon our un
derstanding of across-gender differences in argumentation.
In order to pursue such an approach, however, we must account for where
these subgroup differences might arise from. It may well be that there is a
biological component to individual gender differences. However, it is also

undoubtedly the case that biological features are ineluctably modified by
social circumstances, so that these social circumstances become at least as

potent, if not more potent, as predictors of human behavior than do initial,

minor, biological differences. As they manifest themselves in particular in
dividuals, social circumstances can be described as "positional variables."
Positional variables have to do with the roles and responsibilities that one
believes that one must attend to in society. A variety of components construct
one's position. Some of the factors relate to social class, some to ethnicity,
religious training, familial structure, relative abilities, sexual orientation, and
to individual idiosyncrasy (which may or may not be anything more than the

specific interaction of these other features). In the construction and decoding
of arguments, the positional factors that will influence one's interpretation of
those arguments may fall into two classes: topic-invariant and topic-variant.
Topic invariant factors are those which remain constant across subjects. They
would presumably manifest themselves whether the argument at hand relat
ed to the best way to bake a chocolate cake, how to engineer a missile, or
whether lying was ever a good thing. Topic invariant factors would arise from

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State 7Univer

Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
4

SPEAKER AND GAVEL

basic training in argumentation style that carried across situations or from
positional factors that were so fundamental that they impacted all topics. We
do not know if there are any topic-invariant factors in the processing of
argumentation. Studies designed to test that question would be quite elab
orate.

Topic-variant factors are those which are related to the specific topic at
hand. If one is positioned with certain responsibilities with respect to a given
subject, one presumably would construct different arguments and decode
arguments in different ways than persons who are otherwise positioned. With
regards to genetics, for example, since women are positioned with greater
responsibility for children in our society, we would expect that they might
process arguments about genetics differently from men. More particularly,
however, we would expect that women who expected to have heavy re
sponsibilities with regard to children would be uniquely different from any
other persons who did not have such positioning. The following study ex

plores such processing differences. It concludes that those who are socially
positioned as subject to greater responsibility with respect to an argument
will be more sensitive to negative judgmental contents of those arguments
than those who are not so positioned, and that this, not biological sex, ac
counts for perceived differences in processing of arguments. In the case of
the processing of genetics arguments, this translates into an apparent gender
difference in argument reception between men and women that can actually
be attributed to a sub-group of women with expectations for relatively large
families.

Study Design

We report here a post hoc analysis of the gender component of a study
designed to test the impact of different forms of genetics arguments upon
people's opinions of genetics. The study involved 137 students, 66 self-des
ignated as female and 77 self-designated as male, in basic communication
courses in a large southern research university. After answering basic de
mographic questions, students were assigned to read one of two forms of a
"news report" about genetics. One version was drawn from discourse of the
type "voluntary hereditarianism" (VH) common in American public dis
course in the early 1970's. This discourse contained negative judgments of
persons with genetic illness embedded in its word choices. It represented
genetic illness as a "taint" upon a family and, while it left the choice not to
reproduce open to the individual, it suggested that individuals with genetic
illnesses should choose not to reproduce. The second version was drawn
from the discourse of the type "medical genetics"(MG)common in Amer

ican discourse in the early 1990s. This discourse did not contain such neg
ative judgments of genetic illness. It medicalized genetic differences and
emphasized the need to avoid discrimination against the ill.
After reading one of these passages, student participants were asked to
answer four sets of questions. The first set were open-ended questions that
asked for their general interpretation of the key metaphors of the two dis
courses—the "lottery" vs. "the blueprint." The second set were closed ques
tions that asked them to rate their agreement or disagreement with a statehttps://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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ment about genetics on a 1 to 7 Likert-type scale (see Table 1). The third set
of questions asked them to indicate which of a series of positions would
most likely be held by the author of the article. The last set of questions
asked them to make judgments about the general population's interpretations
of the blueprint and lottery metaphors.
Our goals were to compare men and women to see if there were differ
ences between these two groups, and then to further subdivide the groups
to explore whether or not these differences were accounted for by particular
positionings of the two genders. We found a rather stark and clear difference
with regard to the number of children that women expected to have, a factor
obviously significant with regard to genetics.
Results and Interpretations

On the majority of questions, there was no statistically significant differ
ence between men and women in their response to their personal opinions
with regards to genetics. However, with regards to two sets of questions there
were significant differences in the means between men and women. The first

set of questions were those that asked what expectations the respondent had
with regard to their children. At the p < .05 level, men were significantly
more likely to say that they wanted their children to be "perfect," "normal"
and "like me" than were women (see Tables 1 & 2). Women were signifi
cantly more likely to say that they wanted their children to be "healthy." In
addition to these differences with regards to preferences about children, there
were significant differences between the means for men and women with
regards to their opinions about social support for genetic discrimination.
Women were significantly more likely to think that insurance companies
should not discriminate against those with genetic disease and that the gov
ernment should regulate genetics to prevent discrimination (see Table 2).
These differences in opinions seem to be related to clear patterns in dif
ferences of interpretation of the genetics argument. Men and women read
the two versions of the genetics argument differently in patterns that seem
to reflect these differences in underlying attitudes. While there were no dif
ferences in how men and women who received the "medical genetics" dis
course interpreted it, there were clear differences in how men and women
who received the "voluntary hereditarianism" discourse interpreted this
more negatively judgmental argument. Women were significantly more like
ly to interpret the VH discourse as more negatively judgmental against hu
mans with genetic disabilities. On question A3, which sought to tap audience
interpretations of the stringency of standards implied about desirable qualities
in children, men tended to see the VH article as similar to the medical

genetics article in terms of the author's attitudes toward desired children (see
Table 3). They tended to place the author of the VH passage in the more
tolerant categories, holding mostly that the author of the article would have
the opinion that "people should have only healthy children" or that "people
should not try to determine what kind of children they will have." Women,
on the other hand, thought that the attitudes of the author of the VH passage
were less tolerant. Unlike the MC article, they thought that this author be
lieved that "people should only have perfectly healthy children" or "healthy

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State 9Univer

Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [], Art. 1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL

Table 1. Questions Reported in This Study'
I. Your opinions (1 = Agree, 7 = Disagree)
M2. Persons with genetic disease come from tainted families.

MS. If persons witn genetic disease have children, it will decrease the overall
fitness of the human species.

M6. Efforts to limit population growth should include discouraging people with
genetic diseases from reproducing.

M8. Persons with genetic flaws should not have children.
M9. Our genes determine our physical form, our mental characteristics, and our
behavior and personality.
Ml 1. I would like my children to be perfect.

Ml3. I would employ genetic technologies to increases the chances of having a
healthy child.

Ml4. Our genes influence our physical form, our mental characteristics, and our
behavior and personality.
Ml 5. I would like my children to be healthy.

Ml 7. Insurance companies should not discriminate against those who have ge
netic flaws (Note: this questions was recoded in the program to invert the
direction).

Ml 9. The government should regulate genetics to prevent discrimination.
M22. I would like my children to be normal.
M23. Human beings should control their genetic legacy.
M24. Each of us has some form of genetic flaw. The differences are only matters
of degree.
M25. I would employ genetic technologies to have a perfect child.
M28. I would like my children to be like me.
II. Author's Opinions
A3. The author of the article would most likely hold which of the following opin
ions?

A. People should only have perfect children.
B. People should only have perfectly healthy children.
C. People should only have healthy children.
D. People should only have normal children.
A6. the author of the article would most likely hold which of the following opin
ions?

A. The government should regulate reproduction to reduce population and
the genetic load on the human species.
B. Individuals should regulate their own reproduction to reduce population
and the genetic load on the human species.
C. Individuals should make decisions about reproduction based on their own
needs and desires.

D. The government should provide social support so that individuals can
make free choices about their reproduction without facing economic dis
crimination.

A7. Which of the following statements best captures the author's attitude toward
those with genetic illnesses?
A. They come from bad families.
B. They are victims of a disease and should be treated the same as anyone
else with an illness.

C. They are just like everyone else.

Only questions that yielded statistically significant results at the p < .05 level are
reported.

https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1

10

et al.: Volume 32, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1994/Winter 1995/Spring 1995/
SPEAKER AND GAVEL
Table 2. Male v. Female Attitudes on Genetics

QuestionA/ariable

Sex

Mean

male
female

SD

t

P

3.5909

1.771

-2.11

.036

4.2714

1.970

2.80

.006

-2.33

.021

-2.06

.041

-3.50

.001

2.81

.006

Child preferences
Mil*

Ml 5

M22

M28

male
female

1.3636

.572

1.1304

.380

male
female

1.9242
2.4783

1.378

male
female

2.5252
3.0000

1.395

male
female

5.1970

1.648

6.0857

1.305

4.5781

1.631
1.635

1.385

1.351

Anti-discrimination
Ml 7**

Ml 9

male
female

3.7826

* See Table 1 for list of questions referred to in this study. Only items with p < .05
are reported here.
** Item was recoded in reverse order.

children." They did not think that the author thought that "people should
not try to determine what kind of children they will have" (see Table 3).
The same pattern of interpretation occurred with regard to question A6,

which sought to estimate the audience's interpretation of the desirability of
regulating reproductive practices by various agents. Women were far more
likely than men to place the VH article on the more judgmental, less tolerant
end of the scale. Women tended to see the VH article as advocating either
government regulation of reproduction or at least individual regulation of
their own reproduction for social ends, rather than seeing the article as sup
porting individual choice for personal desire or government support of in
dividual choices (see Table 3).

The pattern also held for question 7, which sought to estimate author at
titudes toward people with genetic diseases. The men did not seem to pick
up on the strong judgmental taint of the voluntary hereditarianist discourse,
with its references to tainted blood, secretism, and corruption. They were
most likely to see the VH author as holding the position that genetic illnesses
were diseases just like any others. Women, on the other hand, were signif
icantly more likely to interpret the VH author as holding the position that
those with genetic diseases "come from bad families." The substantiveness
of these findings is reinforced by the fact that on other questions, those which
related to less judgmental issues such as degree of determinism and locus of
control, there were no statistically significant differences between men and
women. Hence, the response seems particular to negative judgmentalness.
Two interpretations of these patterns of difference are available. The po
sitional approach would hold that those who are positioned with initial val
ues at odds to an argument are more likely to be sensitive to negative judg
ments embedded in an argument than are those whose initial values are
more consonant with the argument. The other interpretation is that men and
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Table 3. Male vs. Female Interpretations of Genetics Arguments
"Voluntary Hereditarianism"
Answer
a

b

c

d

e

P

A3

male
female

1
2

4

11

6

8

13

17

1

4

5
11

10
20

8

7

3

2

7
21

18
14

10.67368

.03049

10.17245

.01716

8.14326

.01705

A6

male
female
A7

male
female

5
2

"Medical Genetics"

No questions showed significant differences at the p < .05 level.

women are just different in the way they respond to arguments, women being
more sensitive to negative judgmentalness in general. To assess these two
models, we explored whether there were differences with regard to women
who were themselves positioned differently. The number of children that
women expect to have seemed to provide a topic-relevant positioning on
the subject of genetics (Condit, 1995).
Findings with Regard to Children Expected

To determine the impact of the number of children participants expected
to have on their interpretations of genetics arguments we divided men and
women into "high-child" and "low-child" groups. The "high-child" group

consisted of those who said that they expected to have three or more chil
dren. The "low-child" group consisted of those who said they expected to
have zero, one, or two children. It was necessary to group the "3" children
group with the "high-child" group in order to get sets large enough for the
statistical test. This is conceptually justified by the fact that the two child
family is normative in the United States (Gallup, 1991). The results of these
analyses strongly support the positional model: the opinions of high-child
and low-child women differed dramatically from each other and in their
relationship to similarly positioned men's opinions; further, with regard to
the interpretations of the judgmentalness of the VH discourse, only the highchild women showed a statistically significant set of differences from men.
First, with regard to the receiver's own values, the patterns of attitudes of
high-child and low-child women were dramatically different. Low-child
women were significantly more judgmental (M8, M24), more determinist
(M9, Ml 4), and more control oriented (Ml 3, M23, M25) than were highchild women (see Table 4). Second, the patterns of differences between men
and women were strikingly different when we compared high-child women
to high-child men and low-child women to low-child men (see Tables 5 &
6). Whereas high-child women were more likely to be opposed to what has
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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Table 4. Women's Attitude Differences by Expected No. of Children
Question/
Variable*

Condition

Mean

M8

Low-child

4.6000

1.516

High-child

5.3929

1.257

M9

Low-child

3.0500

1.339

High-child

4.2143

1.729

Ml 3
Ml4
M23

M24

M25

SD

t

P

-2.27

.026

-3.13

.003

-2.80

.007

Low-child

2.9750

1.656

High-child

4.1071

1.618

Low-child

2.8462

.002

4.0357

2.8462
4.0357

-3.18

High-child
Low-child

3.9500
4.7857

3.9500
4.7857

-2.47

.016

High-child
Low-child

5.3500

.975

-2.09

.040

High-child

5.8214

.819

Low-child

4.6500

.033

5.5357

1.545
1.795

-2.18

High-child

'See Table 1 for list of questions. Only results p < .05 are reported here.

been called the "geneticization" ideology (Nelkin & Lindee, 1995)than were
high-child men, low-child women were more likely to be supportive of a
genetic ideology than were low-child men. High-child women were signif
icantly less judgmental (M2, Ml 7, M26), less determinist (M3), less control
oriented (M5, Ml 3, M23, M25 ), and more tolerant of diversity in their chilTable 5. Attitude Difference: High-child Men vs. High-child Women
Question/
Variable*

Sex

M2

male
female

M5

male
female

Mil

Ml 3
Ml 7

M22
M23
M24

M25

M28

Mean

SD

t

P

5.2308

1.451

-2.22

.031

6.0174

1.331

4.3462

-2.61

.012

5.4286

1.719
1.317

-2.44

.018

-3.29

.002

-2.77

.008

-2.86

.006

-2.55

.014

male
female

3.4615

1.749

4.6786

1.906

male
female

2.6538

1.623

4.1071

1.618

male
female

4.8846
.07146

1.966

male
female

1.5769
2.3929

male
female

3.7308
4.7857

1.687

male
female

5.1154

1.071
.819

-2.73

.009

5.8214

male
female

1.810
1.795

-2.42

.019

5.55357

male
female

2.1538
3.0714

1.156
1.359

-2.66

.010

4.3462

1.086
.902
1.166

1.343

* See Table 1 for questions. Only results p < .05 are reported here.
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Table 6. Attitude Difference: Low-child Men vs. Low-child Women

Questions/
SO

t

P

M6

male
female

4.94714

1.469

2.12

.037

4.1500

1.819

M9

male
female

4.0789

1.836

2.84

.006

3.0500

1.339

MIS

male
female

1.3421
1.1026

.534
.307

2.42

.018

M19

male
female

4.5676

1.642
1.547

2.53

.013

Variable*

Sex

Mean

3.6410

* See Table 1 for questions. Only results p < .05 are reported here.

dren (Ml 1, Ml 8, M22, M25, M28)than were high-child men, whereas lowchild women were significantly more judgmental (M6), determinist(M9), and
control oriented than were low-child men. The only statistically significant
differences between low-child men and low-child women in preferences

about their own children went in the opposite direction from the overall
male-female means. Low-child women were less likely than men to say that

they wanted their children to be healthy (whereas all women as a group had
been more likely to say this). The only way in which low-child women seem
to have been more opposed to geneticization than low-child men was that
they were significantly more likely to believe that the government should
prevent genetic discrimination (Ml 9). If we compare low-child women to
low-child men, therefore, we get a reversal of our characterization of men
as a group and women as a group.

Analysis of attitudes by gender suggests, therefore, that differently posi
tioned women have dramatically different attitudes toward genetics. Some

groups of women have attitudes towards geneticization that are more con
sonant than those of similarly positioned men, whereas other groups of wom
en have attitudes towards geneticization that are more opposed to genetics
than are similarly positioned men. The stark reversal of patterns found here
among subgroups suggests that for the most part, subgroup differences make
interpretation of overall means of men and women quite misleading. This
also appears to have a clear impact in accounting for the way in which
different groups process arguments.
In short, there were no significant differences between low-child men and
low-child women in their interpretations of the genetic discourse, whereas
high-child men and women interpreted the discourse differently on both
items A3 and A7 (see Table 7). Thus, the observed differences in sensitivity

to negative judgments attributed above to gender are more specifically ac
counted for by women who intend to have many children. It is this group
that picks up on the judgmental qualities of the voluntary hereditarianist
discourse, more than simply "women in general." While all women are
somewhat subject to the responsibilities of child bearing and rearing, women
who expected to have large families are positioned to be the most subject
to those responsibilities, and it is not surprising therefore that it is they who
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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Table 7. Interpretations of Genetic Arguments by Child Expectation and Gender
High-Child Men vs. High-Child Women
Answer
A3

male
female

a

1
1

b
2
8

d

e

C^

P

7

5

10

10.29222

.03578

2

1

16

C^

P

c

Answer
A7

male
female

a

b

c

2
10

12

12

8

10

6.24965

.04394

Low-child Men v. Low-child Women

No significant differences at the p < .05 level.

are most sensitive to argumentative contents that would increase their guilt
or task load with regard to choosing their child's genetic configuration.
Conclusions

This study has been formative and exploratory only. We have sought to
examine the extent to which within-gender differences in argument process
ing may be more important than between-gender differences, and to suggest
that ignoring within-gender differences may actually lead to misinterpreta
tions with regard to gender difference. In this case, a dichotomous gender
approach that examined only the difference in means between men and

women would have led to the faulty interpretation that women are less judg
mental about genetics issues than men and more likely to process judgmental
argumentative messages as negatively judgmental than are men. Instead, ex

amination of sub-group differences indicates great diversity within women.

It indicates that depending on their positioning with respect to expected
child-raising responsibilities, women are either more control oriented and

judgmental than similarly placed men (if they expect few children) or less

control oriented and judgmental than similarly placed men (if they expect
more children). Furthermore, it is the latter group who best account for the
differences in interpretation of messages, so that it is one's vulnerability of
position on an issue, rather than one's gender per se, that leads to the inter
pretation of a nonfavorable argumentative message as judgmental.
Due to the fact that this exploration is based on a single, post hoc ex
amination, we would urge caution in the application or overgeneralization
of these findings. This study should not be treated as a conclusive demon
stration that within-gender differences always or usually outweigh acrossgender differences. However, it does provide a clear example that calls into
question the continuation of "business as usual" with regard to gender dif

ference studies. There are good reasons to believe that a bipolar gender
model is as likely to be misleading as informative—statistically significant
results on bipolar gender hypotheses may mask gender diversity. Thus, those
pursuing gender difference research are encouraged to test within-gender
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differences as well as across-gender differences to insure that their research
is not producing overly simplistic conclusions. While a model of gender
diversity is not yet established as an alternative to gender dichotomy, it is
certainly reasonable to suggest that it should be a hypothesis that we pursue
rigorously.
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THE ARGUER'S IDENTITY:
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE

PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY
Carrie Crenshaw, Ph.D.
Unversity of Alabama

Traditional argumentation and interdisciplinary feminisms have an impor
tant assumption in common. Argumentation is admired for its promotion of

a practical art that has the potential to make a significant difference in the
lived experience of human beings, particularly in the context of democratic
participation. Likewise, the relationship between theory and practice is a

central concern for many feminists, the synthesis being a necessary ingre
dient in the avowedly political feminist agenda. This connection resonates
with a basic tenet of feminist thought; the personal is political.
Feminist intellectuals associate the "personal" with the "practical" and the
"political" with the "theoretical" (Warren "The Truth" 103). Theory, from a

feminist point of view, is expected to play a practical part in transforming
oppressive social relations. Its object is to make a difference in the lives of

real women and men rather than constructing theoretical abstractions that
have little relevance to everyday experience.
However, unlike traditional argumentation theory and the liberalism upon
which it relies, feminist scholars tend to pay more critical attention to the

identity of the subject in the center of theories about human political life.
Eisenstein, Jones, Sapiro and others have noted that theories about human

political life typically involve a human subject whose identity is abstracted
to stand for a kind of theoretical everyman. For example, many political
theories rely upon an abstract conception of the "citizen" which is assumed
to be gender neutral. Feminist intellectuals have engaged in productive cri
tiques of this theoretical identity arguing that the abstracted subject often
prevents the meaningful development of practical theory because it ignores
the lived experience of women thereby excluding women's pragmatic con
cerns from traditional approaches to theory development. The result has been
that women's issues arising from personal experiences have often been rel
egated to and devalued as private considerations not worthy of public delib
eration (Elshtain; Okin; F^teman).

In this essay, I argue that future development of any theory of argument
claiming to make a real emancipatory difference must be guided by close
examination of the theoretical construction of the arguer's identity. My initial
premise is a simple though important one. The identity of the competent
arguer resides at the heart of any meaningful intersection between the theory
and practice of argumentation. Based on this premise, I suggest that if ar
gumentation theorists are to achieve the goal of making a practical difference
to all human beings, we need to explore how our theoretical conceptions of
the arguer's identity expand or limit access to the identity of a competent
arguer for every individual. Thus, this essay constitutes an initial foray into
the importance of the identity question in argumentation. It is designed to
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stimulate dialogue about the impact of our theoretical assumptions on prac
tical argument. Specifically, we can learn from women's experiences in in

tercollegiate debate as a microcosm of the practice of argument theory in
order to formulate some basic propositions about the identity of a competent
arguer that will be equally accessible to all human beings.
The Arguer's Identity;

The Nexus of Argumentation Theory and Practice

The major distinction between formal logic and informal reasoning or ar

gumentation rests upon a conception of argument that emphasizes the humanness of the enterprise. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Toulmin, for
example, point out that any real understanding of argument depends upon
the inclusion of human perception and interaction in the process, things that

formal logicians ignore. Other argumentation theories assume the truth of
this proposition but tend to rely upon unexamined assumptions about the
identity of the human arguer.

For example, many scholars justify the importance of their theories with
claims about the role of argumentation in promoting individual and collec

tive civic participation. They define their theories through descriptions of
argument practices with which any (abstract) individual can supposedly iden
tify (Crenshaw 129). Yet, by centralizing the study of argument itself, these
theorists make arguments, rather than arguers, the principle objects of study.
Such a focus may beg the identity question because the majority of the
discursive practices that are studied are men's arguments (Spitzack & Carter;
Campbell). Thus, the identity of the arguer has always played a central, albeit
frequently unexamined, role in major theories of argumentation.
Brockriede was one of few scholars who sensed the importance of explic

itly examining the identity question when he maintained that "the nature of
the people who argue, in all their humanness, is itself an inherent variable
in understanding [and] evaluating" argument (1). Privileging the importance

of the identity of the arguer allowed him to transcend the limits of the formal
logician who safely ignored human beings by focusing solely on the argu
ment itself. Yet, Brockriede's attempt to engage the identity question had its
own iimitations. Burdened by the unopened baggage of sex and gender, his
sexual metaphors for ethically classifying argumentative motives and inter

actions ignored the historically and materially located meaning of sex and
gender in our society (Altman 486).'
In contrast, feminist scholars consciously seek to unpack these meanings

and investigate the subject's identity through a gender lens. Feminism has
contributed to our understanding of the relationship between theory and

practice by examining the identity of the subject who resides in the center
of any given theory relating to humans and human experience. The fruits of
this task have been many and varied contributing to a united commitment
' Brockriede classified arguers into three categories: rapist, seducer and lover. He
suggested that the arguer as rapist was the least ethical, aiming for dominance of the
co-arguer for unilateral gratification and so on. Brockriede seemed to ignore the im
plications of the fact that rape is a crime of violence most often perpetrated by men
upon women.
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to improving the situation of women as well as men Oaggar & Rothenberg
xii; Keohane, Rosaldo & Gelpi vii; Rosaldo 417).

Intercollegiate Debate and Women's Experiences as Arguers

For similar reasons, I hope to refocus the development of argumentation
theory on the arguer's identity through an exploratory analysis of women's
experiences in intercollegiate debate. Because traditional argument theory
has relied upon an abstract conception of the arguer that does not account
for women's experiences with the actual practice of argument, it often fails
to achieve its goal of promoting the practical art of argument based upon
egalitarian principles. I argue that further development of argumentation the
ory must account for women's experiences with sexism while explicitly the
orizing the identity of a competent arguer. While argumentation scholars
theorize that every individual can equally identify with the practice of ar
gumentation, in practice, women's access to the identity of competent arguer

is often restricted. To illustrate these propositions, I describe three aspects of
women's experiences in intercollegiate debate and argue that these experi
ences constitute challenges to scholars seeking to formulate a theory of ar
gument that supplies equal access to the identity of competent arguer.
Feminist standpoint theorists like Hartsock have argued that women's ma
terial experiences can provide a starting point for the reformulation of an
drocentric theory. Standpoint theory posits that individual and collective ex
perience inform a variety of perspectives on society. These perspectives are
historically and materially located in the real relations of humans with one

another. Perspective is a central element of human identity and can be struc

tured by the experience of oppression. As such, it can serve as a starting
point for personal social and political transformation (Hartsock). To under

stand these perspectives and their impact upon the identity question,feminist
standpoint theorists focus on women's material experiences in society.
Like standpoint theorists, this essay focuses on women's experiences for
the purpose of challenging androcentric theories of argumentation. Unlike
standpoint theorists, I do not limit this analysis to material relations alone.
Instead, I examine discourses about women's roles as arguers in intercolle
giate debate, women's encounters with certain sexist cultural constraints ex
pressed through what is often said to them and about them in the debate

world. Doing so recognizes that human symbol use impinges upon material
reality by shaping, ordering and creating understandings of our world
(McCee 3).

Intercollegiate debate is a real material as well as symbolic social order
that is centrally characterized by its promotion of argument practice. Because
of the unique nature of intercollegiate debate as a bounded forum for ar
gument, scholars claim that the study of intercollegiate debate practice can
tell us about argumentation theory (Goodnight; Rowland & Fritch; Rowland,
Voth & Bossman). These authors suggest that intercollegiate debate supplies
a model for testing spheres theory because it is a relatively pure forum fo
cused within the public sphere. In a sense, these authors assume that debate

is an application of argumentation theory, a real life example of spheres
theory in practice.
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Intercollegiate debate is also an appropriate forum for studying the identity
question in argumentation theory for two reasons. First, many debaters and
coaches spend so much of their time involved in the activity that they admit
its influence on their conception of their own identity. Even those who spend
less time in debate report that it has been a seminal influence in their lives
(Colbert & Biggers). We often talk about the "debate forum" or the "debate
culture." We perceive debate to be a "world" in which we move. Students
who participate often identify themselves as "debaters" and academicians
describe themselves as "debate coaches." As such, intercollegiate debate

constitutes a significant aspect of students' and coaches' identities. I suspect
that many of you personally understand what I mean by the distinction be

tween merely participating in debate and actually being a debater or coach
and perhaps even the difference between having participated in an argument
and considering yourself an arguer. Our participation in debate influences
how we conceive of ourselves. It structures our personal identity in part.

Second, the practice of intercollegiate debate is largely structured by the
assumptions of traditional argumentation theory including the slippage in the
supposedly gender-neutral construction of the arguer as anyone who can
identify with the argument practices of the public sphere. The most common
rationale for intercollegiate debate is that it develops critical thinking skills
necessary for rational collective decision making (Colbert; Cross; Follert &
Colbert; Freely; Gruner, Huseman & Luck; Hill; Howell; Jackson; Trank;
Whalen). Critical thinking skills are considered a valuable asset for students
because they facilitate professional preparation and participation in a dem
ocratic society (Colbert & Biggers; Ehninger & Brockriede). The prevalence

of legal and policy-making analogies for explaining debate theory reflect the
presumption of its location in the public sphere. Fundamentally, these skills
enable our students to participate effectively in public argument.

Complaints about debate moving away from a public speaking model
might seem to contradict my claim. However, as Rowland and Deatherage
point out,

debate is now aimed at sharpening the research, critical thinking and orga
nizational skills of students so that they can become effective advocates be

fore government commissions, courts, and other decision-making bodies
[italics added]. (247).

Even if we agree that debate is moving away from its public speaking ori
entation, it is still justified by the importance of argument as a public enter
prise. The rationale for a debate practice that prepares advocates to argue
before specialized decision-making bodies located in the public sphere
means that the raison d'etre of intercollegiate debate is still the promotion
of argument as a public enterprise.

The assumption underlying this rationale is that every student can learn to
identify equally with the argumentative practices of the public sphere. If we
teach all of our students the effective practice of public argument, they will

be equally able to move through and contribute to professional and civic
life. Drawing upon classical liberal views, these justifications assume that we
need only to prepare each individual student to be competent arguers and
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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they will have equal access to influence argumentative outcomes in the pub
lic sphere.
However, this rationale tends to ignore the gendered asymmetries that
women experience as arguers. Various sexist experiences in debate hinder

women's access to the identity of competent arguer in the public sphere.

This parallels Eraser's feminist critique of the supposed gender-neutrality of
spheres theory in general. She argues that women are no longer completely
confined to the private sphere as some earlier feminist critiques suggested.
Instead, the problem with spheres theory is that it fails to take into account
the asymmetries that subject women to unwanted invasions of and a lesser
ability to define and defend their privacy (597). Women often are devalued

in the public sphere because they are women. Spheres theory does not ad
vocate women's exclusion from public sphere participation, but it nonethe

less fails to theorize women's experiences thereby ignoring argument prac
tices that marginalize women.

To illustrate how these theoretical assumptions about the arguer's identity
impact women in practice, I turn to a discussion of some of women's ex

periences in intercollegiate debate. For the purposes of this discussion, I draw

heavily upon my own experience and my personal knowledge of other wom
en's experiences who have crossed my path in sixteen years of association

with high school, NDT and CEDA debate as well as some reliance upon
studies reported by other researchers. I do not pretend that my depiction is
completely representative of all women's experiences in intercollegiate de
bate, nor will I suggest that there is some kind of essential "female debate
experience." Women's experiences are many and varied, and some women
may not see themselves or their experiences herein. However, I do believe
that my experience and the experience of other women that I describe here

has not been uncommon. Just as Brockriede described a way to think about
arguers based on his experience with argument, I am attempting to offer
some thoughts about how experience should influence the ways in which
we think of the arguer's identity.
It is important for women's own voices to be the ultimate determinant of

their own experience, but even if I had conducted a survey of women in
intercollegiate debate and reported the results of that survey through direct
quotations, I would still be placed in the position of interpreting their ex
periences for them. Like Alcoff, I recognize the dangers of "speaking for"
others. If I pretend to transcend my social location when making epistemic
claims from a privileged position, the result may well be to perpetuate the
experience of oppression. One part of the experience of oppression is to be
(misjrepresented by others who enjoy the power to speak and be heard.
Another is to be drowned out by voices that are privileged.
However, a retreat from argument on my part would be an abdication of

political responsibility and social interconnectedness in favor of political ap
athy. Worse still, the result may well be political inefficacy. As a way to
balance these concerns, I ask that my analysis be read as an invitation to
dialogue—an engagement in a discussion about women's experiences in in
tercollegiate debate as a starting point for the identity question in the creation

of practical argumentation theory. Indeed, it could not be more, for I certainly
cannot speak for all women given my privileged social location. What fol-
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lows are some initial observations about some women's experiences in in

tercollegiate debate that impinge upon our conception of the identity of the
competent arguer.

The Incompetence of Femininity

Debate, and argument more generally, are often understood through war

metaphors.^ Argument is frequently described as winning or losing a battle
of words; argumentation is a "wordy war" that sublimates the more lethal
pursuits of physical combat (Warren "Charlotte" 357). Combat metaphors
also are pervasive in debate jargon. Debaters "hit" other teams at tourna
ments or declare their argumentative success on an issue announcing "we're

killing them on this issue." Because warfare has historically been the prov
ince of men, understanding argumentation through war metaphors, tends to
conflate the terms masculine and human (Warren "Charlotte" 357). For the

major part of our history, the military forces have denied women membership
and when women finally entered the military profession, their exclusion from
combat prevented them from obtaining leadership positions and both reflect
ed and buttressed a cultural presumption that war is men's domain.

In addition, tournament participants will often describe winning and losing
in terms of sexual metaphors that describe harm done to debaters or their

opponents who have lost a round. Baker argues that such metaphorical con
structions place women in a passive role.
Names for males are the subjects of sentences with active constructions (that
is, where the subjects are said to be doing the activity); and names for fe
males require passive constructions (that is they are the recipients of the
activity—whatever is being done to them). Thus, we would not say "Jane did
it to Dick," although we would say "Dick did it to Jane." (57-58)

While sexual metaphors that describe harm done to an individual can be
constructed so that women are the perpetrators of the harm, it is still true
that the metaphor denigrates the female role. Suppose someone
wishes to express malevolence as forcefully as possible without actually
committing an act of physical violence. . .. One of the strongest possible
ways of tefling someone that you wish to harm him is to tell him to assume
the female sexual role relative to you. ... Clearly, we conceive of the male
sexual role as that of hurting the person in the female role. (61)

The use of sexual metaphors describing winning as a form of harm done to
other debaters situates the understanding of the female role as passive and
victimized.

By analyzing some of the common metaphors in the debate community,
it is not my intention to advocate censorship. My claim is that the frequent
use of combat and sexual metaphors may be a sign of a kind of cultural
assumption that equates femininity with being weak, passive and less com

petent. One common negative result is that women frequently are subjected
to a double standard about the acceptability of assertiveness.

Many women have described the thin line they walk when deciding ex2 For a thorough and interesting discussion of the use of war metaphors in inter
collegiate debate, see Knutson.
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actly how assertive to be. If they are as assertive as male debaters, they often
are judged to be overly aggressive and not feminine enough. If they choose
to be less assertive, they often are perceived as lacking confidence and com
petence. These experiences are a sign that debate culture contains a pre
sumption that equates incompetence with femininity, yet nonetheless insists
that women be feminine. The presumption of the incompetence of femininity
is reinforced by another kind of experience that interferes with women's
equal access to the identity of competent arguer.
The "Great Woman Debater" Phenomenon

Many women I know can recount the following from personal experience:
"Oh, (insert female debater here), you are one of the best women debaters
I have ever seen! You are as good as (insert female debater here) was." A
less complimentary version of the account is "Well, you're pretty good for a
woman." A more ambiguous statement might be "Isn't it great that women
like you are doing so well!" The interpretation of these comments depends
heavily on an understanding of the context in which they are made. Some
versions of these statements may be made and taken as a meaningful com
pliment or a celebrations of women's accomplishments. Yet, in many in
stances, these remarks are revealing declarations of the devaluation of wom
en's communication as a segregated whole. Several studies suggest that
women's communication is often seen as less powerful or persuasive or in
teresting than men's communication (Penelope; Henley; Hamilton & Thome;
Thome, Kramarae & Henley; Spender).
This premise applied to intercollegiate debate may not be immediately
acceptable to those of us who can recall association with women in debate
who are or were examples of excellence to all of us. In certain contexts,
mention of these women and their achievements can be empowering, and
it is not my purpose here to discount their distinction. Nonetheless, I believe
it is essential to understand the dynamic of the "Great Woman Debater"
phenomenon.
The "Great Woman Debater" is sister to what Spitzack and Carter have
identified as the "Great Woman Speaker" category of rhetorical study. Re
search falling into the category of "Great Women Speakers" recognizes the
influence of great women and attempts to demonstrate that women too can
be powerful and contribute to society despite their historical exclusion from
the public sphere. However, Spitzack and Carter, I think rightly, caution that
the study of great women speakers may serve to perpetuate traditional and
unfair standards for the judgment of greatness that will continue to exclude
most women from communication research (405).

Their point and mine is not to demand a "genderblind" approach to the
study of rhetoric and argumentation. Rather, the difficulty of the "Great
Woman Debater" phenomenon lies in its exclusionary implication. It is anal
ogous to describing women as "women attorneys" or "women professors,"
for such a description, while recognizing that women have entered these
professions, still defines the profession as male-dominated by requiring the
adjective "woman" to make its meaning clear. When one woman is elevated
to the status of greatness in direct contrast to the majority of women, the
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implication is that she is the exception and that most women do not have
the capacity to achieve the status of competent arguer. This may appear to
be confirmed when a debater looks around herself and finds a dispropor
tionate number of white males winning speaker awards and advancing into
elimination rounds (Stepp; Logue).
Moreover, she might wonder if the "compliment" is "backhanded" in that

her greatness is somehow lessened or diminished in comparison to a male
norm. Women who describe the "Great Woman Debater" experience often
point out that they have never heard anyone say to a man "You are the best
male debater I have heard in a long time!" Yet, perhaps the most troublesome
outcome of the "Great Woman Debater" phenomenon is its potential to pit
women against each other. When the standard of comparison is other wom
en, it may arbitrarily increase the pressure to compete against them or, al
ternatively, promote a desire to avoid them thereby impeding empowering
alliances with other women who may have similar concerns including the
next experience I describe.
Your Personal Life is Now Public Domain

Many women who participate in intercollegiate debate find that the details
of their personal lives, particularly their romantic interests, sexual life, and
reproductive choices become the subject of public discussion and judgment.
This can take many forms ranging from sexual harassment to generally de
meaning community gossip. The existence of both gender and sexual ha
rassment in intercollegiate debate has been well documented (Stepp, Simerly
& Logue; Szwapa).

The following survey response cited in Szwapa's study is so vivid in its
description of these experiences, I am compelled to include it here.
In rounds, I have been called babe, girl, honey, sweetie. I've been talked
down to, called stupid and even touched. I've been winked at, have had
judges tell disgusting jokes In front of me and my partner (who Is also a
woman) In rounds. Outside rounds I've been straight out propositioned to
sleep with men, to go out with them, to have a drink with them, etc. In fact,
I've been treated as a debate ornament. I sometimes feel the only reason
debate lets women In Is so men have something to gawk at, sleep with, etc.
At other times, I seriously question why I could let these things happen to
me and other women In debate and still be Involved after everything I've
witnessed. I don't know If these things qualify as harassment according to
the proper definition. But what I do know Is my experience. My experience
tells me that women are marginalized and treated poorly In this activity.(44)

When women are demeaned in this fashion, it seems preposterous to suggest
that women have equal access to the identity of competent arguer.
In many instances, judgments about women's competence as arguers is or
has been tied directly to discussion of their personal lives. For example,
women's accomplishments are frequently diminished by unfair gendered or
sexualized pronouncements. If the judge is male, she won because he
thought she was attractive. If the judge was female, she won because of the
judge's feminist bias. In sixteen years, I myself have been variously accused
of sexual liaisons with judges for ballots, with debaters for evidence, and
with coaches for favors.
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Coaches who are women have suggested that their reproductive choices
influence judgments of their competence. Women who choose to have chil
dren, who perhaps previously enjoyed a reputation as a good judge or a
good coach, find that once they have a child they are assumed to be less
competent—as if their years of experience somehow evaporated at the onset
of pregnancy or the moment of birth. These experiences suggest that indi
vidual women are often denied equal access to the identity of competent
arguer.

Equal Access to the Identity of Competent Arguer
The previous discussion suggests that women's access to the identity of
competent arguer is restricted by their experiences with sexism in the actual
practice of argument in intercollegiate debate. If, as others have suggested,
intercollegiate debate is a microcosm of public argument that constitutes a
forum for testing argument theory, then women's experiences within that
forum should suggest some avenues for the reformulation of a practical the
ory of argumentation. The barriers women face suggest some critical topoi
or challenges for argumentation theorists.
First, theories of argument should avoid conceptualizing argumentation as
a form of dominance. Argumentation as dominance feminizes losing thereby
suggesting the incompetence and weakness of femininity. It subjects women
to the double standard for assertiveness. When loosing is equated with fem
ininity, women are pushed toward a masculinized form of aggression but are
punished when they do so for stepping outside the boundaries of femininity.
The very conception of what it means to win an argument and to be a
competent arguer can be gendered. Gendered dominance metaphors used
to explain the operation of practical argument circumscribe a conception of
women empowered to engage in competent argument. Argument scholars
should avoid masculinizing the identity of competent arguer through gen
dered dominance metaphors.
Second, theories of argument should avoid constructing standards of com
petence derived solely from men's experience and arguments. Doing so re
sults in the evaluation of women in comparison to a privileged male norm
and defines competent arguers who are women as exceptions to that norm.
The problem with the "Great Woman Debater" phenomenon lies not in its
celebration of successful debaters; rather, it arises from the explicit or implicit
assumption that successful women are the exception to the male norm. This
assumption constitutes a gendered barrier to women's access to the identity
of competent arguer. Standards for the judgment of argumentative excellence
that have been derived from men's experiences perpetuate an unfair paragon
of greatness from which the majority of women are excluded.
Third, and perhaps most important, argumentation scholars should theo
rize the arguer's identity in a way that offers equal authority to define the
boundaries of spheres and in such a way that individual arguers are empow
ered to defend and define their role in the public sphere. "Your Personal Life
is Now Public Domain" suggests that women are not denied access to the
public sphere of intercollegiate debate per se. Rather, when they move in
this sphere, they are subjected to intrusions into their personal lives by sexual
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and gender harassment and sexualized condemnations of their competence
as arguers. This confirms Eraser's analysis of spheres theory which departs
from "the familiar orthodoxies of an earlier stage of feminist theory, which
protested women's alleged confinement to the private sphere," instead point
ing out asymmetries that subject women to unwanted, invasions of and lesser
ability to define and defend their privacy (597). It further suggests that judg
ments about women's argumentative competence are tied to their lack of
power to define the boundaries of public space. While women are not com
pletely relegated to the private sphere as earlier feminist criticisms suggested,
their access to the identity of competent public arguer is seriously hampered
by this lack of power.
In this essay, I have suggested that the failure of traditional argumentation
to focus on the identity of the competent arguer has prevented the mean
ingful development of a practical theory of argument, one which tells us how
real life arguers can strive for equal participation in civic life. The exami
nation of women's experiences in intercollegiate debate reveals how a the
oretical rationale for argumentation that ignores the identity question and
consequently the lived experience of women allows for the perpetuation of
exclusionary argument practices. It is in a sense conservative in its inclination
to preserve the current practice of argumentation instead of theorizing what
possibilities inhere in an emancipatory theory of argument.
From the standpoint of women in debate as an example of argument in
practice, equal access to the identity of competent arguer has been limited
and the justifications for intercollegiate debate ignore these experiences by
relying upon theories of argumentation that fail to explicitly examine the
identity of the human arguer. The most common rationale (firmly based in
argumentation theory) for intercollegiate debate merely posits the existence
of a public sphere and the necessity of competent argument in that sphere.
Yet, in practice, the competent arguer is often constructed and judged ac
cording to a male norm.
As an alternative, I suggest that we should pursue a theory of argumen
tation based upon a commitment to equal access to the identity of competent
arguer for all women and men. As such, it would constitute an ethical con
ception of argumentation, an approach that offers standards for evaluating
argument practices based upon how they ensure or deny equal access to the
process of argument itself. It might also suggest practical strategies for em
powerment through argument for those currently marginalized by exclusion
ary conceptions of competent argument. Addressing the identity question
would also help to transcend a significant limitation of this essay, its sole
focus on gender. More studies need to investigate how current argument
practices evidence racist, heterosexist, and classist tendencies as well.
While the full development of such a theory is beyond the scope of this
essay, the arguments here do provide some groundwork for future research
in this area. Such research could be grounded in two approaches. First, future
research could focus on how current argument practices interfere with access
to the identity of competent arguer. Case studies of exclusionary argument
practices could focus on how access to the identity of competent arguer is
restricted based on categories of gender, race, class and sexual orientation.
Second, argumentation scholarship would benefit from more specific case
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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studies of the practical arguments made by arguers who have historically
faced barriers in the public sphere due to gender, race, class and sexual
orientation. These studies might reveal how those at the margins have re
sisted restrictive judgments about their competence and used argument as
their avenue for empowerment.
I am very hopeful about the potential for such a reformulation; despite
these three negative constructions of women's competence, though in lesser
numbers, intercollegiate debate still continues to attract women and supply
them with many advantages. When the discussion turns to the question; why
do or did you stay in the activity when faced with these barriers, women
often respond with descriptions of their respect for other women and men
in the activity, the solidarity they experienced with other women and men
who are concerned about eliminating inequality, and the value of argument
itself. The value of argument as a practical art integrally intertwined with our
most precious democratic ideals resides in the intersection between theory
and practice. To theorize argument practice and practice argument theory
better, we need to more closely examine the arguer's identity.
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"JUST BETWEEN YOU AND ME":
"FEMININE STYLE" AND "FEMININE COZE"
IN CONNIE CHUNG'S INTERVIEW WITH THE
PARENTS OF NEWT GINGRICH

Randy Richardson, Ph. D.
Berry College
Christina Moss

Young Harris College
In recent years the emergence of feminist rhetorical theory has called into
question the theoretical foundation of traditional rhetorical theory, exposing
the limitations of what Rushing refers to as "the old rules of the patriarchy"
(83). Feminist scholars continue to contribute concepts and constructs which
enhance our understanding of rhetoric and gender. One such concept,"fem
inine style," represents a conglomerate of rhetorical strategies which were
identified in early American women's discourse and which characterize the
political rhetoric of contemporary female leaders(Campbell,"The Rhetoric";
Dow and Tonn). Campbell's observation of the rhetoric of women's liberation
spawned the notion that the distinctive style of the discourse results from an
attempt to raise consciousness (79-81). Dow and Tonn's analysis of Texas
Governor Ann Richard's rhetoric extends the parameters of feminine style to
include political empowerment. An analysis of Connie Chung's interview
rhetoric will suggest that rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style
may be used to affect disclosure.
Connie Chung's infamous interview with Bob and Kathleen Gingrich, par
ents of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, sparked a national debate about com
munication and ethics. Society publicly wrangled over such issues as the
appropriateness of the epithet allegedly used to describe the First Lady, the
journalistic ethics involved in attaining the revelation, and the nature and
process of assigning meaning to words (Budiansky 20; Carlson 36; "Contro
versy" 16). And while the rhetorical implications far outweigh the political
significance of the event, it should be noted that the story dominated the
television and radio news media on the House Speaker's first day in office,
and the incident has been liked to Chung's abrupt departure from the CBS
Evening News (Carter "CBS Worries" A8).

A rhetorical analysis of Chung's Gingrich interview offers insight into the
social issues surrounding the incident. Beyond this, a rhetorical approach
will inform regarding the employment of feminine style to achieve the goal
of interviewee disclosure. A strategy that we will call "feminine coze" is
identified and described.

Rhetorical Dimensions of the Television Interview

Television interviews play an increasingly important role in the contem
porary political landscape. From Senator Edward Kennedy's inability to articSPEAKER AND GAVEL, Vol. 32, Nos. 1-4 (1995), 26-37.
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ulate the motivation for his presidential aspiration to Roger Mudd in 1979,
to H. Ross Perot's 60 M/nufes comments, to Bill Clinton's saxophone wielding
Arsenio Hall gig, the potential impact of the personal television interview is
evident. Politicians and celebrities concerned with crafting favorable public
images turn to the television interview because it allows for a more control
lable situation than other formats and because it provides, or appears to
provide, the public with what they want to see—an 'inside' glimpse. The
television interview has become an important political tool in the image
oriented campaigns of the nineties.
One glaring fact of contemporary mass communication is that public com
munication is becoming more private. Tannen claims ". .. our society is
becoming more private than public in orientation, more gossip-like in public
domains" (105). She contends that this shift in orientation results in "an

increased interest in the private lives of public people" (105). Television
programming suggests that Americans are obsessed with encountering "pri
vate" information from a public medium. A plethora of talk shows' "soft"
news programs, news magazines and game shows have emerged which fo
cus viewer attention on the intimate details of the lives of celebrities or even

total strangers. The personal interview plays a significant role in many of
these programs.
The fact that politicians use the personal interview rhetorically is hardly a
revelation. However, a rhetorical aspect of the interview that tends to be
overlooked is the appeal of the interviewer. The interplay between interview
er and interviewee represents an attempt to draw viewers. Rhetorical choices
are made by television personnel and by the interviewer herself in an attempt
to encourage participation in the program.
The television interviewer functions somewhere between the realm of the

private and the public. Interviewers seek identification on two levels, with
the interviewee and with the television audience. Typically, success in the
public realm depends on the personal interaction. An interviewer who fails
to permeate the celebrity's public personae or elicit a unique revelation may
be found waning in the Nielsen ratings. This is particularly true in the case
of the political interview. The typical prime-time viewing audience is not
naturally drawn to political issues and people. The political interview must
make headlines or provide unique insight in order to be a popular success
in prime time.

The television interview is both an interpersonal, or small group interac
tion, and a mass communication event. The demands of one aspect of the
rhetorical situation often affect the other. The incongruity of having a per
sonal chat with a relative stranger in front of 30 million viewers creates a
unique rhetorical situation.
"Just Between You and Me" Revisited

Connie Chung's interview with Bob and Kathleen Gingrich, which aired
January 5, 1995, on CBS's Eye to Eye with Connie Chung, touched off a
chain of events that many believe lead to her firing. The New York Times
reported that Chung "had become the object of some of the most ferocious
criticism ...ever directed at any network anchor" as a result of the interview
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(Carter, "CBS Worries" A8). House Speaker Gingrich angrily denounced
Chung's tactics, claiming, "I think it is unprofessional and frankly pretty des
picable to go to a mother... and say, 'whisper to me' and then share it with
the country"(DeWitt A23). President Clinton himself acknowledged Chung's
impropriety by quipping, "God knows what she could have gotten my
mother to say" ("Clinton's Reply" A20).
Public perception of the interview reflects the manner in which the event
was reported. The following passage from Newsweek typifies the negative
slant of the coverage.
Last week Gingrich showed how he could use Big Media's worst tendencies
to his advantage. In an interview in the CBS newsmagazine "Eye to Eye,"
Connie Chung coyly baited Newt's 68-year-old mother into saying what her

son really thought of First Lady Hillary Clinton. "Why don't you just whisper
it to me, just between you and me," Chung coaxea as the cameras rolled.
"She's a bitch," whispered mother Gingrich. For Newt, the incident was a
gift. He was able to be appropriately outraged, accusing Chung of "ripping
off his mother for rating. (Waldman 17)

The report leaves no doubt about who was at fault in the interview. Phrases
like "coyly baited," "coaxed," and "appropriately outraged" suggest that
Chung had overtly deceived Mrs. Gingrich. Despite CBS's claims that Mrs.
Gingrich "knew exactly what she was doing" (Budiansky 20) and that her
comment was "unsolicited" (DeWitt A23), and in the face of Chung's per
sonal defense on the program itself that "Mrs. Gingrich was sitting before
three cameras and television lights, with a microphone on. It was clear that
what she said would be broadcast" (16), Chung was portrayed, almost unan
imously, as the villainess. Why? The obvious answer is that Chung simply
lied to Mrs. Gingrich when she claimed that the comment would be "just
between you and me" and then broadcast the statement to the nation. How
ever, an analysis of the context of the communication suggests that the
phrase, "just between you and me," was quite obviously meant to include
an audience consisting of more than "just you and me."
In order to understand the phrase that made headlines, it is necessary to
examine an earlier segment of the interview. This early interaction is crucial
in light of what follows:
Chung: Is he (Newt) a true Southerner?
Mr. Gingrich: No.
Mrs. Gingrich: No.
Mr. Gingrich: He was born in Harrisburg Hospital.
Chung: Pennsylvania.
Mr. Gingrich: Yeah, and he lived in Pennsylvania until '53.
Chung: So he's kind of a Yankee. Newt's a Yankee.
Mrs. Gingrich: (Whispers) I think so.

Chung:(Whispers) But we won't tell anybody.
Mrs. Gingrich: OK. It's better—because he nas enough Democrats against
him. (10)

While none of the reports of the incident mentioned this interaction, it is
noteworthy because it establishes a communication precedent, a "shared
reality," an inside joke which explains the newsworthy whisper that follows.
Though the program is obviously edited, the logical sequencing of questionhttps://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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ing suggests that this interaction preceded the comment about Hillary Rod
ham Clinton.

The Gingriches approach Chung's question about Newt's status as a "true
Southerner" cautiously. There is a pause after the question, and the Gingrich
es establish eye contact and seem to reach nonverbal agreement before an
swering the question in the negative. Based on the mutual testimony Chung
provides the conclusion, "Newt's a Yankee." Mrs. Gingrich's whispered reply
of agreement is obviously meant as irony. She is speaking softly as if to say,
"We don't want his Georgia constituents to hear this," realizing that the
microphone, camera, and CBS would carry this message virtually every
where. Chung recognizes the joke, leans forward toward Mrs. Gingrich and
with a tone of mock seriousness whispers her humorous response, "But we
won't tell anybody." Mr. Gingrich clearly understands the humorous incon
gruity and laughs audibly at the mock secrecy. What is not mentioned in the
transcript but is perfectly clear on the CBS video tape is that the first three
words of Mrs. Gingrich's next response, "Ok. It's better," were delivered in
the same sarcastic stage whisper. The humorous nature of this episode is
undeniable. After Mrs. Gingrich finishes her statement, she shakes with
laughter. An inside joke regarding the public nature of this "private" con
versation was obviously shared by Chung and Mrs. Gingrich. Certainly no
one would argue credibly tbat Chung meant for the sentence, "But we won't
tell anybody" to be taken literally. The meaning of the comment is estab
lished by the context.
The now infamous portion of the interview begins with Chung questioning
Mr. Gingrich about his son's relationship with the President. After a few brief
questions and responses Chung turns her attention to Mrs. Gingrich.
Chung: Mrs. Gingrich, what has—what has Newt told you about President
Clinton?

Mrs. Gingrich: Nothing, and I can't teii you what he said about Hillary.
Chung: You can't?
Mrs. Gingrich: I can't.
Chung: Why don't you just whisper it to me, just between you and me?
Mrs. Gingrich: (Whispers) She's a bitch. About the only thing he ever said
about her. I think they had some meeting, you know, and she takes over.
Chung: She does?
Mrs. Gingrich: Oh yeah. Yeah. But when Newtie's there, she can't. (14-15)

Mrs. Gingrich clearly turns the topic of the inquiry to Hillary Clinton. In
fact, there is no pause or hesitation between the words "Nothing" and "and,"
as Mrs. Gingrich shifts the focus from President to Mrs. Clinton. It also should
be noted that Mrs. Gingrich smiles, ever so slightly, as she mentions Hillary.
Chung responds with a raised eyebrow look of surprise and an upwardly
inflected, "You can't." After introducing the topic herself, Mrs. Gingrich infers
that she cannot disclose any more regarding her son's opinion of Hillary. This
set up the pivotal moment of the interview.
Chung leans forward, gestures toward her ear, and smiles slightly as she
makes her "just between you and me" plea. The comment is greeted by
barely audible laughter from both Gingrich parents. The same shared reality
that made Chung's earlier "But we won't tell anybody" comment an inside
joke, elicits laughter from the Gingriches because they understand the in-
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congruity of the "private public" statement. While Mrs. Gingrich whispers
her son's strong opinion, she returns to full voice to explain the comment.
In fact, her vocal tone is emphatic when she makes the statement,"she takes
over." This is yet another indication that Mrs. Gingrich jokingly used the
whisper. Furthermore, the conspicuous presence of at least three camera
operators and other production crew members precludes a literal interpre
tation of the phrase. If she believed that the whisper was truly confidential,
then it seems ridiculous to offer full-voice evidence in support of the harsh,
whispered opinion.
The phrase, "just between you and me," was not meant to be understood
literally. An analysis of the statement in its context and the communicative
behavior surrounding the comment support this claim. If Mrs. Gingrich was
not cleverly deceived, as most of the media accounts plainly state or strongly
suggest, then what did occur? Is it possible that Mrs. Gingrich joked with
Chung, trusting that the journalist would "edit out" the potentially damaging
revelation? This interpretation shifts the issue from deception to betrayal. The
question that emerges from this scenario is, why did Mrs. Gingrich trust
Chung to such a great degree? The answer may be explained by a rhetorical
application of Campbell's concept of feminine style (Man Cannot 12-13).
Feminine Style and the Gingrich Interview
The rhetoric of Chung's Gingrich interview exhibits rhetorical strategies
associated with feminine style. Dow and Tonn summarize Campbell's con
struct as follows:

In a rhetorical situation, these attributes produce discourse that displays a
personal tone, uses personal experience, anecdotes and examples as evi
dence, exhibits inductive structure, emphasizes audience participation, and
encourages identification between speaker and audience. (287).

These five interrelated strategies pervade the interview and represent an at
tempt to produce identification on two levels: between Chung and the Gin
griches, and between the interview agents themselves and the viewing au
dience.

The establishment of a personal tone was quite clearly a priority of the
Eye to Eye production crew. The opening shot of the interview derives from
inside the Gingrich home. It features Bob Gingrich smearing icing on a cake.
He is interrupted by a knock on the door. When he opens the door, he finds
Connie Chung had dropped by for a chat. When one considers that the
camera had to be in position inside the home before the neighborly journalist
came calling, one understands the contrived nature of the event, and the
measures that were taken to portray a personal context. Mr. Gingrich presents
Chung with his homemade "finger-licking good" cake and proclaims, "I
knew you were coming so I baked a cake" (8). This comment is greeted by
a friendly burst of laughter from Chung.
The establishment of a personal tone seems to be the order of the day.
Mrs Gingrich comments,"He sits right there and does his crossword puzzles.
And I watch TV and drink my coffee and have my cigarettes. Ours is the
same routine. You can count on it" (8). From this moment forward, much of

https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1

34

et al.: Volume 32, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1994/Winter 1995/Spring 1995/
SPEAKER AND GAVEL

31

the dining-room table interview is viewed through the haze of Kathleen Gin
grich's cigarette smoke, while Bob Gingrich leisurely sips his coffee.
The sharing of details contributes to the personal tone of this public con
versation. Mrs. Gingrich reveals her personal nickname for the 51 year-old
House Speaker, "Newtie"(8). The Gingriches disclose details about personal
events ranging from Mrs. Gingrich's abusive first husband to Mr. Gingrich's
refusal to attend Newt's first wedding. While the Gingriches, especially Mrs.
Gingrich, freely share information about extremely personal topics, it should
be noted that Chung initiates the discussion in personal areas. Throughout
the interview she leads them to, and through, the disclosure of personal
details.

The use of a personal tone enhances identification among the interview
agents. Chung's personal reactions, especially her nonverbal responses, sug
gest empathy. Her constant eye contact, frequent nods and reassuring smile
suggest agreement and identification. Perhaps her most obvious use of sup
portive reactions occurs when Mrs. Gingrich makes her famous "bitch" com
ment. Chung audible gasps "oh" as if to suggest shock or surprise. It is
difficult to believe that a seasoned journalist of Chung's caliber is shocked
by a harsh comment about the First Lady allegedly emanating from Newt
Gingrich. Chung's nonverbal behavior changes drastically when she con
fronts the Gingriches with negative accusations about Newt (13-14). She
completely avoids eye contact by referring to her notes—a nonverbal means
of distancing herself from the negative information. Throughout the interview
Chung strategically responds to the Gingriches in an attempt to foster iden
tification.

An attempt to bolster audience involvement is evident at two levels.
Chung's empathetic reactions and leading questions obviously involve her
primary audience, the Gingriches. The disclosure of personal details, the
presentation of a "homey," personal setting, and the emphasis of the contro
versial revelation all represent rhetorical choices focused on involving the
viewing audience.
The use of personal experience, anecdotes, and examples as evidence
should come as no surprise, since these are the basic elements of almost any
interview. In the Gingrich interview these strategies form an implied induc
tive argument designed to enhance the newly-elected House Speaker's cred
ibility. Mrs. Gingrich shares personal experiences about her first marriage
and her son's first marriage. She relates an anecdote about her talkative son
and his ability to "take me around the world" while washing and drying
dishes together (11).
Mr. Gingrich relates personal experiences and anecdotes a bit more re

luctantly. His most vivid use of these strategies occurs when he shares the
story of his trip, with Newt, to Verdon. According to Mr. Gingrich the visit
to this battlefield compelled Newt to become politically active, so that he
"could see that this never happened again" (12). The Gingriches combine
personal experience, anecdote, and example to reflect favorably on their
son's character and political involvement.
Personal experiences, anecdotes, and examples are used as evidence to
support unstated, but strongly implied inductive arguments. The Gingriches
do not state plainly, "Newt Gingrich is a good person and a strong political
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leader." Instead, they supply carefully selected experiences, anecdotes, and
examples which lead an audience, bit by bit, to a favorable conclusion. An
implied inductive argument, or the attempt to construct one, is present in
nearly every interview where an individual seeks to enhance one's image.
However, interviewees must realize that interviewers may be constructing
inductive arguments of their own, which may potentially contradict their
purpose. Chung observes, in a voice-over toward the beginning of the inter
view, that Newt Gingrich's public image is full of "apparent contradiction"
(10). The Gingrich interview segment of the program is structured around
these contradictions—a "Southerner" who is really a Yankee, a man who
publicly preaches family values but divorced his first wife while she was
battling uterine cancer, a conservative Republican family man with a lesbian
Democrat for a sister, a sophisticated House Speaker who called the First
Lady a bitch. The conclusion to which the program appears to lead, bit by
bit, example by example, is "Beware he's not what he claims to be"—a far
cry from the Gingriches' message. The interview agents use the same ex
amples as evidence to support vastly different inductive conclusions.
Feminine Coze as Rhetorical Strategy

Chung's use of rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style, con
tributed greatly to Mrs. Gingrich's whispered revelation. In sharing extremely
personal details about an abusive first husband, her son's doomed marriage,
her son's ambitions, her relationship with her son, etc., Mrs. Gingrich re
ceives supportive, empathetic reactions from Chung. As Mrs. Gingrich argues
that her son is a good person Chung appears to agree. Burke's notion that
identification involves a joining of interest, real or perceived (20-21), offers
the possibility that Mrs. Gingrich perceives Chung as identifying with her.
Tannen offers further insight into identification among female communi
cators. Tannen observes that "The noticing of details shows caring and cre
ates involvement. Because women are concerned first and foremost with

establishing intimacy, they value the telling of details" (115). Wood suggests
that disclosure of details signals close friendship among female communi
cators (185-187). While Chung values the sharing of details for quite another
reason, it is possible that Mrs. Gingrich felt as if a level of intimacy was being
established with Chung. Tannen provides further evidence for this possibility.
She notes that women are often drawn together in "trouble talk," or lament.
"They bond in pain" (100). Perhaps Mrs. Gingrich felt this bond developing
as she shared with Chung her personal account of abuse. The third-person
nature of the interview may have also drawn the women together in Mrs.
Gingrich's view. Tannen explains that, "Talking about someone who is not
there is a way of establishing rapport with someone who is there. By agreeing
about their evaluation of someone else, people reinforce their shared values
and world views" (107).

Chung's feigned identification and personal style wrought an ill-advised
trust in Mrs. Gingrich. Malcolm explains how this trust is formed in the arena
of print journalism.
He (the reporter) is a kind of confidence man, preying on people's vanity,
ignorance, or loneliness, gaining their trust and betraying them without re-
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morse. On reading the article or book in question, (the source) has to face
the fact that the journalist—who seemed so friendly and sympathetic, so keen
to understand him fully, so remarkably attuned to his vision of things—never
had the slightest intention of collaborating with him on his story but always
intended to write a story of his own. The disparity between what seems to
be the intention of the interview as it is taking place and what it actually
turns out to have been in aid of always comes as a shock to the subject. (3-4)

While this description may represent an overstatement, there is little doubt
that Mrs. Gingrich would agree with this assessment as it applies to her
television interview.

The use of rhetorical strategies associated with feminine style lead to Mrs.
Gingrich's disclosure. However, the very nature of the appeal contradicts the

purpose of the feminist rhetoric from the consciousness raising small groups
associated with the early feminist movement. Campbell explains that the goal
of these groups was "to make the personal political" ("The Rhetoric" 79).
Participants encountered this process through shared experience. By sharing
personal accounts of individual problems, group members developed a com

mon understanding of the trials and injustices associated with their position
as women (Campbell, "The Rhetoric" 79). Personal disclosure was the agen
cy used to achieve the purpose of raising social consciousness.
In the contemporary mass media interview, disclosure is the ultimate goal.
There may, or may not be, a larger issue or argument to which the disclosure
is related. Whereas, disclosure in the early feminist movement represents a
means by which the disclosing individuals could be enhanced, disclosure in
the mass media context is produced for audience consumption. The exposure
of negative qualities in the disclosing agent may be the result, and at times
even the goal, of the interview.
The journalistic manipulation of feminine style lacks the genuine nature
of, what has heretofore been identified as feminist rhetoric. Rhetoric which

resembles feminine style, but which has as its end, disclosure, might be more
accurately described by the terms, feminine coze. The term, "coze," refers
to a "a friendly talk, chat" {World Book 480). The modifier, "feminine" is
retained because the rhetoric more typically resembles feminine rhetoric in

form and context. The rhetoric shares stylistic similarities with feminine style,
as has been previously demonstrated. Also, as Tannen points out, the sharing
of personal context over public aspects of the situation also suggest a femi
nine perspective (Campbell, "Femininity and Feminism" 101; Campbell and
Jerry 123). However, as is the case with feminine style (Campbell, Man Can

not 12), feminine coze is not a style exclusive to women. One might be just
as likely to observe the strategy in the rhetoric of Geraldo Rivera or Larry
King, as in the rhetoric of Barbara Walters or Connie Chung. Feminine coze
is characterized by more than a resemblance to feminine style. In Chung's
Gingrich interview, the following rhetorical strategies are evident: feigned
familiarity, the appearance of empathy and agreement, identification through
humor, probing questions, and agenda-setting. Feigned familiarity is used as
a means to emphasize the personal nature of the conversation. Interviewees
will often cooperate with this strategy so as not to appear cold or impersonal.
In the Gingrich interview, the dining-room setting, appearance of a neigh
borly visit, "inside" joking, and a personal tone all contributed to an air of
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familiarity. A person is much more likely to disclose personal information to
a familiar friend than to a meddling stranger.
The appearance of empathy and agreement plays an important role in the
encouragement of disclosure. Empathy implies a "feeling with" the inter
viewee, while agreement suggests a "thinking with" the sources. The most
typical display of empathy or agreement is nodding one's head in response
to speech. Chung exhibits empathetic behavior while Mrs. Gingrich relates
the story of her abusive husband. She nods and shifts her eyebrows down
ward as if to suggest disapproval of the abusive behavior. The nod of agree
ment is useful to the interviewer because listeners are rarely held account
able for nonverbal behavior. An interviewer can appear to agree with a state
ment in order to motivate further disclosure. In fact, unless the nod blatantly
serves the interviewer's purpose as it relates to the viewing audience, it is
likely to end up on the editing room floor.
Identification through humor serves to alleviate tension and build rapport
among interview participants. Human agents are drawn together by a similar
perception of humor. Chung strategically uses humor as both a source and
a receiver. She perpetuates the inside joke regarding the public nature of the
interview with a whispered, "but we won't tell anybody." She responds to
Mr. Gingrich's "I baked you a cake" comment with an uncharacteristic,
hearty burst of laughter. Shared laughter may suggest a similarity of perspec
tive and it may also serve to remove interviewee inhibitions.
Probing questions function quite obviously and directly in the attempt to
affect disclosure. Questions like, "He was a bit abusive?" and "Why didn't
you go to the wedding?" probe into personal realms and result in revelations
that Chung would not have otherwise motivated.
A final characteristic of feminine coze is agenda-setting. Certainly any
professional journalist is going to establish an agenda, or at least plan a list
of questions for an interview. The interviewer concerned with disclosure will
guide the questioning toward areas in which it is likely to occur. Tannen
would suggest that inquiries regarding personal details, lament, or gossip will
build rapport and enhance disclosure. Chung's questions about Mrs. Gin
grich's spousal abuse, and her inquiry regarding Newt's relationship with the
President, reflect a carefully planned agenda designed to achieve disclosure.
The interviewer cannot tell the source what to say, but she can direct the
conversation to selected topics.
Observations

Chung's use of feminine coze was effective in motivating disclosure in the
Gingrich interview. The attempt to draw viewers, however, was only mod
erately successful. While the program was rated slightly higher than previous
weeks programs, it managed only a ranking of 58th for the week. An esti
mated 9,231,600 homes, or 15% of the total television audience tuned in to

the saga ("Ratings Week" II 8). Eye to Eye was canceled by CBS in May of
1995, shortly after Chung was "removed" from her co-anchor post (Kloer
C7; Carter "CBS Removes" A16).

The theoretical similarities between rhetoric exhibiting feminine style and
the rhetoric of the mass media interview are striking. The philosophical founhttps://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1

38

et al.: Volume 32, Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, Fall 1994/Winter 1995/Spring 1995/
SPEAKER AND GAVEL

35

dation of feminist rhetoric points to obvious similarities between the rhetor
ical genres. Feminist rhetoric grew out of private, small-group meetings. It
reflects the experiences of the women who crafted it. Most interviews are
similarly founded in the personal experience of the interviewees. Both rhe
torical situations are characterized by an attempt to make what is private
and personal, public.
The difference between feminine style and feminine coze is an important

one. Campbell compares the consciousness-raising strategies of the early
feminists to Natanson's concept of genuine argument"(Campbell "The Rhet
oric" 79; Natanson 15-6). The goal of early feminist rhetoric was to enhance
the understanding of the disclosing agents. Conversely, feminine coze often
seeks to affect disclosure solely for the interests of the observer. Unlike early
feminist rhetoric, feminine coze is effects-driven, often voyeuristic in nature,
and occasionally potentially damaging to the disclosing agent.
Ethical implications regarding the use of feminine coze abound. The com
municative behaviors associated with feminine coze are ones generally re
lated to effective listening skills and positive, friendly interaction. Ethical is
sues emerge as communicators employ these behaviors deceptively, in order
to encourage disclosure. Disclosure, in and of itself, is not necessarily an
ignoble goal. However, the deceptive motivation of disclosure serves to neg
atively affect the credibility of personal, public communication. Perhaps the
worst ethical breach occurs when production staffs edit interviews to em
phasize ideas obviously not intended by interviewees. As Malcolm suggests,
this behavior is "morally indefensible" (3). Mass media audiences and rhe
torical critics should be aware that rhetoric exhibiting the outward appear
ance of feminine style is not necessarily genuine in nature.
Critics may claim that the identification of feminine coze perpetuates an
extremely negative feminine stereotype—the wile witch who will use what
ever means necessary to get the goods. The description and application of
feminine coze represents an attempt to analyze rhetorical actions. Rhetors
should be aware that the use of the behavior may perpetuate the age-old,
maleconstructed myth. Feminine coze is not limited to females, nor is it
consistent with the purpose of feminist rhetoric. Perhaps the strategy devel
oped as a means of addressing the duality that confronts women public
speakers. In her study of early feminist rhetoric, Campbell mentions inap
propriate rhetorical strategies advanced by women. She writes, "In still other
cases, rhetors found womanly ways of persuasion that were self-contradic
tory, and hence ultimately damaging to their cause"(Man Cannot 12). Fem
inine coze may be one such rhetorical strategy.
Several gender-related issues surround the interview. Would a neighborly
visit have been portrayed if Dan Rather had been conducting the interview?
Would Mrs. Gingrich have revealed her son's opinion about the First Lady
to Rather? Would Rather have held to such intense scrutiny? Rarely did neg
ative feminine images (the witch, the bitch, and the helpless old lady)emerge
from the interview. Further analysis of the interview may reveal answers to
these intriguing questions of communication and gender.
Feminine coze may be useful in explaining the rhetorical impact of several
mass media interviewers. The effectiveness of Barbara Walters, Oprah Win
frey, Geraldo Rivera, and a host of other celebrity interviewers might be
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evaluated in light of feminine coze. Beyond this, feminine coze could also
play an important role in such situations as medical doctor/patient interac
tions, psychoanalytical sessions, the corporate grapevine—virtually any sit
uation in which disclosure is a goal. While the rhetorical dimension asso
ciated with a mass audience would be lost in these contexts, the rhetorical

nature of disclosure-seeking interpersonal interactions is undeniable. Further
refinement and application of feminine coze could offer valuable insight into
a variety of rhetorical situations.
A rhetorical analysis of Connie Chung's interview with the parents of Newt
Gingrich reveals much about contemporary journalistic ethics, feminist rhe
torical theory and the rhetorical nature of the television interview. Chung's
"Just between you and me" comment represents a rhetorical style more than
a literal, overt lie. Her use of strategies, heretofore associated with feminine
style, demonstrates that arguments reflecting these strategies are not neces
sarily genuine in nature. Chung's employment of feminine coze brings to
light a potentially deceptive rhetorical strategy aimed at affecting disclosure.
The identification of this strategy may prove useful in the description, anal
ysis, and evaluation of a variety of rhetorical acts.
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FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, STRUCTURATION
THEORY AND COMPLIANCE-GAINING:
AN EXPLORATORY INTEGRATION

Janie M. Harden Fritz, Ph.D.
Duquesne University
What Anthony Ciddens calls structuration (Giddens, 1984) directs atten
tion to how social actors' behavioral regularities or patterns relate to social
structure: social structure provides resources by which individuals carry out
daily interactions, and in the process that very structure is reproduced. This
structure is identifiable by members of a culture as having enough substance
to influence action, though it is physically insubstantial (Berger & Luckmann,
1966). Structuration theory unites psychological and sociological realms of
inquiry and has been used to examine relationships and roles (Secord, 1982)
and conversation during legal proceedings (Molotch & Boden, 1985).
Structuration theory, because of its focus on resources employed in the
production and reproduction of social life, provides both a rationale and a
backdrop for the intersection of theories or perspectives that address intentionality and power in human interaction, especially those that involve the
individual and the societal level. Two domains of inquiry seem to fit well
together under the rubric of structuration theory. These are the quantitative
studies of compliance-gaining and the critical perspectives of feminist theory.
Compliance-gaining, or interpersonal influence, is interpersonal persua
sion in which a persuader attempts to achieve behavioral change from an
other person (Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman, & Georgacarakos, 1982). Com
pliance-gaining research can be shown to intersect the individual and cor
porate (societal or organizational) spheres of action, though to date no stud
ies have examined the societal implications of compliance-gaining (but see
Harden, 1988). For example, individuals learn which persuasive resources
are at their disposal and employ them, often with implications for further
compliance-gaining attempts. Likewise, use of a particular persuasive tactic
influences the relationship, altering the context of the next compliance-gain
ing attempt. In that sense, individual action has implications for higher levels
of influence.

Feminist perspectives examine the production and reproduction of social
life. They examine power and resources, in some sense giving structuration
theory contextual embodiment. Feminist perspectives add gender to the in
terpersonal influence literature.
One could argue for structuration theory's direct application to the com
pliance-gaining literature without the mediation of feminist theory. Rules,
resources, and modalities of structuration can be identified through an ex
amination of compliance-gaining tactics and strategies resulting from various
relational configurations (see, for example. Harden, 1988). However,feminist
Author notes:
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approaches highlight dimensions of compliance-gaining missing in other ap
proaches. The last decade's plethora of scholarship on gender's influence on
human meaning and behavior (e.g. Gilligan, 1982; Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) suggests a focus on gender—especially in an area
that has at its heart the notion of power.
One could also argue that feminst perspectives alone could critique the
compliance-gaining literature or use it to justify or abandon several of its
progeny. Structuration theory, however, provides a framework for compli
ance-gaining that fits individual action into larger social structures, which
feminist perspectives find important. Structuration theory connects individual
agency and social structure: what we do individually affects what happens
corporately. It directs us to focus attention on how practices arise from re
source allocation and use in a particular context and hence reproduce the
context for continued practices. Therefore, structuration theory is useful to
feminist theorizing.
The rest of this article explores ways of integrating these three bodies of
research. First will be a presentation of basic elements of structuration theory.
Next will follow a brief discussion of several strands of feminist theory. Fi
nally, structuration theory and feminist theory will be applied to the com
pliance-gaining literature.
Structuration Theory
Giddens(1984)defines "structure" as rules and resources which are drawn

upon by human beings in action and which are organized as properties of
social systems (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). The "reproduced transformational re
lations" which take place as a consequence of carrying out everyday action
and interaction, and which are organized as regular social practices, consti
tute "systems," while structuration itself is defined as a set of "conditions
governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore the
reproduction of social systems" (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). "Resources" are
means of enablement by which actors exercise power. They may be tangible,
such as money, or they may be symbolic, such as identification with a re
spected other person.
By the very action of drawing upon rules and resources and enacting be
havior within their enablements and constraints, persons recreate, or even
change through unintended consequences of action, those very structures
which are later drawn upon in their recreated, or modified, form by those
very social actors. In this manner, the individual is both the product and
producer of social structure and thereby of society. Secord (1982) posits that
contemporary forms of social structure derive from a mixture of intentional
and unintentional action in the context of prevailing social conditions.(One
example relevant to a feminist perspective is the shift away from the use of
the generic "he" in academic writing during the past two decades.) Taking
Secord's argument down a level of analysis to the interpersonal realm, the
contemporary form of an interpersonal relationship derives from the same
processes: intentional and unintentional action contribute to the reproduc
tion of the relationship through the daily enactment of the relationship.
What Giddens calls the modalities of structuration—signification, domi-
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nation, legitimation—are drawn upon in the reproduction of social systems.
Signification refers to the communication of meaning; signification is rep
resented in interaction by the act of communication, which is likely to draw
on aspects of the situation to shape meaning. Legitimation has to do with
the normative aspect of human action—that is, expected behaviors in a con
text or relationship in the form of rules and roles. Domination refers to gen
erating command over objects, goods, or material phenomena. In any given
situation, these elements are bound together in action and are separable only
analytically (Giddens, 1984, p. 28).
Giddens suggests that an analysis of structuration of social systems entails
studying the modes in which such systems are produced and reproduced in
interaction: that is, we should look at people's everyday practices. As Connell
(1987) suggests regarding ideology, which can be seen as an aspect of struc
tural domination: ". .. Ideology has to be seen as things people do, and ...

ideological practice has to be seen as occurring in, and responding to, def
inite contexts" (p. 244). For example, Molotch and Boden (1985) describe
the Watergate hearings as an example of how conversations contain power
relations deriving from differential skill in manipulation of the "architecture"
of talk, suggesting that domination is accomplished through the selective use
of talk procedures.
Feminist Theory
This section describes in broad strokes several feminist perspectives, with
the goal of identifying domains of resources marked by each of the perspec
tives. There may be overlap between the perspectives; also, some perspec
tives may be more useful than others when examining compliance-gaining
(e.g. see Buzzanell's (1994) application of selected feminist perspectives to
organizational communication theorizing).
The liberal feminist perspective is the oldest articulation of feminist theory
(Tong, 1989; Johnston, 1992). It derives from liberal political philosophy and
is founded on the notion of equal rights for all human beings(see jaggar, 1983).
Liberal feminists have pinpointed unequal laws and role expectations as a key
problem for women; these laws keep women from exercising autonomy and
fulfilling the self (e.g. the traditional role as wife and mother has kept women
in the private, rather than the public, sphere). Here, resources (or lack thereof)
stem from societal constraints purposely constructed.
The Marxist feminist perspective suggests that it is not unequal laws, but
the concept of class, that is the key to women's oppression: our social ex
istence determines our consciousness (Tong, 1989). "[A] woman forms a
conception of herself that she would not have if her role in the family and
at the workplace did not keep her socially and economically subordinate to
men" (p. 40). The essence of being human is to shape collectively who we
are by transforming and manipulating the material world—that is, nature.
This perspective defines a link between women's work status and women's
self-image. From this perspective, resources (or lack thereof) stem from the
action of class systems, not from purposely constructed laws. Moving within
the constraints of this class and work system will gain or lose resources to
be drawn upon for power.
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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Radical feminists suggest that it is men and their system of patriarchy that
cause women's oppression. This oppression takes form primarily in men's at
tempts to control women's bodies (long, 1989). The roots of women's op
pression are buried deep in patriarchy's sex/gender system with its prescrip
tions of sexual status, roles, and temperament (see Millett, 1970). Through
conditioning and through the working of various institutions such as church,
schools, and media, men secure the apparent consent of women they oppress.
Radical feminists would attempt to remake the world according to a fem

inist vision (Tong, 1989). For example, the masculine world is characterized
by an orientation described as "power over" things and people, whereas a
feminine orientation is characterized by the concept of "pleasure with" and
"power to" (French, 1985). The feminine orientation, unlike the masculine
orientation, is not founded on control of other people. A feminine perspec
tive celebrates the ability of a group or an individual to affirm all others
rather than to subjugate others. From this perspective, the very concept of
resources and how they are used is contaminated by men, creators of these
concepts. Resources from this perspective would derive from alternative
sources yet to be imagined.
Psychoanalytic feminism suggests that the roots of women's oppression are
internal, developed as part of the self since infancy (Tong, 1989). The root
of the female role stems from attachment and individuation processes. For
example, girls end up identifying with their mother rather than separating
from her as boys do. So men, because of separateness from the mother,
cannot relate deeply to others. Their condition leads them to work in the
public sphere with its competition and efficiency. Girls' oneness with the
mother leads to a capacity for relatedness and a nurturing role. Resources
from this perspective are specific to one gender or another.
Gilligan's (1982) work on women's moral systems extends this line of
thought (Tong, 1989). Men and women have different conceptions of mo
rality. Men, because of the importance of separation and autonomy, focus
on justice, fairness, rules, and rights. Women, because of the importance of
family and friends, focus on people's wants, needs, interests, and aspirations.
The typical woman, according to Gilligan, is prepared to forsake some of
her rights if by doing so she will preserve important relationships. It follows
that women have a consequentialist view of morality, considering the effect
of one's action on all who will be touched by it, rather than using abstract
principles to judge the morality of an action.
Socialist feminism can be seen to represent the confluence of Marxist,
radical, and psychoanalytical streams of feminist thought (Tong, 1989). So
cialist feminists see the systems of capitalism and patriarchy as contributing
to women's oppression. The traditional family is seen as serving the interests
of both these systems ideologically, biosocially, and economically. Some so
cialist feminists see patriarchy as a material entity; some see it as symbolic.
Those who take a materialist standpoint (e.g. Hartmann, 1981) suggest that
patriarchy is "a set of social relations between men which have a material
base which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and
solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women "(Hartmann,
1981, p. 14). Men restrict women's access to important economic resources
and disallow women control over reproduction through marriage, childrear-
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ing, the state, and other institutions. This system probably works both sym
bolically and materially; resources available would take both forms.
Existentialist feminism derives from Sartre's existentialism (Jong, 1989). Ac
cording to the existentialist perspective, the essence of being human is being
free to make choices. Simone de Beauvoir (1974) extended the existential

analysis to women's condition in relation to men. According to her (1974),
men have a grasp upon the world that is more extended and powerful than
women's (de Beauvoir, 1974). Men, therefore, produce new and different
things. Women simply reproduce the status quo through producing other

human beings. Since woman is not like man, she becomes "the Other" in
relation to man and oppressed by him because of the male will to power.
Beauvoir's analysis points to biology rather than class as the cause of op

pression. Women's resources depend on their roles in relation to men; only
the prostitute, or hetaira, has any real power (de Beauvoir, 1974).
Postmodern feminism centers primarily on the role of language in women's

oppression (long, 1989; Nye, 1988). According to some postmodern feminist
theorists, men have a pointed, singular way of writing whereas women have
multiple voices (Cixous, 1981). Women have been marginalized, unable to
think in truly feminine ways within the structure of patriarchal thought (Irigaray, 1985). Even the processes of categorization and labeling are patriar
chal.

Nye (1988) examines the concept of women's language, citing several
studies that show differences in how women use language (e.g. Thome &

Henley, 1975; Thome, Henley, & Kramarae, 1983). Many of these differ
ences, she suggests, are due to a lack of power, not to being female per se.
In order to break free, women must assert themselves. But if they are trapped
in male language, as some theorists suggest they are, their attempts are
doomed. Therefore, many postmodern feminists draw on the work of Derrida

and Lacan, advocating a decentering or unbalancing of traditional ways of
thinking and knowing. Theorists like Mary Daly (1978) suggest, for example,
that women should recover old meanings for words currently used in a de
rogatory sense (e.g. crone, hag, spinster) and thereby crack sexist language
apart (Nye, 1988). Resources here come from a new creation, a new use, of
old concepts-a shaping of what already exists into something new, and
through its use giving it power.

Eeminist Theory, Structuration Theory, and Compliance Gaining
Clearly, the many strands of feminist thought suggest different framings of
resources available to women. What follows is a discussion of compliance-

gaining literature from a structurational perspective, supplemented by pos
sible lines of feminist analysis.
Compliance-gaining literature
F^st theoretical approaches to interpersonal influence have been based on
operant learning (de Turck, 1985), constructivism (Clark & Delia, 1979), so
cial exchange (Marwell & Schmitt, 1967), and subjective expected utility
models (Sillars, 1980). The most current attempt has been a goal-based ap
proach (Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). No perspective has examined how
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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compliance-gaining strategies may derive from either the larger social struc
ture or from the idiosyncratic elements of unique relationships, nor is there
a theoretical framework accounting for the transformative action of the ex
ercise of individual power in interpersonal relationships. No one has taken
an explicitly feminist approach to this area, either, though differences in male
and female sales strategies (Sprowl, 1987) and conflict behaviors (Gayle,
Preiss, & Allen, 1994; Miller, 1992) have been reported.
The initial quantitative article on compliance-gaining strategies is the Marwell and Schmitt typology (1967); numerous typologies of strategies and/or
underlying dimensions of strategies have emerged since (Kipnis, Schmidt, &
Wilkinson, 1980; Falbo, 1977; Cody, McLaughlin, & Jordan, 1980; Rule,
Bizanz, & Kohn, 1985). Individual differences in strategy choice and use lie
in areas such as empathy (Hunter & Boster, 1987; Dillard, Hunter, Burgoon,
Boster, & Stiff, 1985), communication apprehension (Lustig & King, 1980),
and dogmatism (Roloff & Barnicott, 1979). Interpersonal power affects choice
of influence strategy (Howard, Blumstein, & Schwartz, 1986), as well as
whether the target is a friend or a stranger. This finding speaks directly to the
concept of resources as well as to relationships. Power, for example, is clearly
a resource, given the findings of the Howard, et. al. (1986) study.
Outcomes of interpersonal influence situations include attributions(Kipnis,
Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976; Kipnis, Schmidt, Price, & Stitt, 1981), sat
isfaction (Richmond, McCroskey, & Davis, 1986), and relational change po
tential (Shaw & Condelli, 1986). These findings suggest that the influence
situation is reflexive and transformative, just as structuration theory would
suggest. For example, Kipnis, et. al. (1976) report that powerholders who
believed they caused the target's behavior devalued the target and acted to
increase social distance from that target. This finding seems to support an
existential feminist perspective of men's view of women as "the Other," es
pecially if men can act upon women and thereby, even unintentionally, dis
tance themselves from women.

Shaw and Condelli (1986) discovered that positive or negative outcomes
to the target are expected to influence the persuader's future use of power
and the persuader's attractiveness to the target, as well as the target's private
acceptance of the persuader's demands. They highlight that the relationship
between a powerholder and a target is affected by the valence of the target's
expected outcomes. Additional research concerning actual compliance-gain
ing situations suggests that social actors who are aware of potential outcomes
from the use of certain strategies alter their behavior accordingly, responding
to perceived constraint (Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). For example, per
suaders take into account not only their primary goal of persuasion (for ex
ample, to borrow money), but potential influence on secondary goals (such
as the relationship between the parties, their own identity, and potential harm
to themselves). These findings suggest not only that the process of compli
ance-gaining is structurational in nature, but that persuaders with differential
concerns for these secondary goals may behave differently. Women's con
cern with relational outcomes (Gilligan, 1982) and also with maintaining
socially acceptable female identities (e.g. Belenky, et. al., 1986) may make
available to them resources different than those of men, or lead them away
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from considering stronger means of influence that may accomplish the pri
mary goal but damage the relationship.
Utility of a feminist structurational approach to compliance gaining
Understanding the compliance-gaining process from a feminist structura
tional perspective requires a look at what structuration and compliance-gain
ing concepts look like in various feminist frameworks.
First, the conceptual domain needs explication and then a feminist read
ing. Compliance-gaining as structuration is the socially constituted (interac
tive) practice of domination (exercise of power, which is the ability to get
things done) brought about by drawing upon the resources available in the
situation by means of signification in order to bring about consequences
which would not take place without the intervention of the agent. Compli
ance-gaining is an attempt to impose constraint on another's life. The system
subject to transformation is primarily the interpersonal relationship at the
level of the dyad, but secondarily the social system to which the dyad con
tributes.

Clearly, from some feminist perspectives, the very definition of the content
domain would need to be redefined. From some radical feminist standpoints,
the very idea of "gaining compliance" is misconceived, implying competi
tion rather than cooperation, "power over" rather than "pleasure with" or
"power to." From the existentialist point of view, compliance-gaining may
be an important sphere of activity, since it involves impelling oneself onto
another, acting on the world. The risks involved become treating "the Other"
as an object to be annihilated rather than as another free self. Other feminist
perspectives can be applied to the specific resources available for compli
ance, but no others address themselves so specifically to the nature of the
action itself, with the possible exception of postmodern feminism, which will
be addressed in the next point.
Consider once again that the essence of a compliance-gaining attempt is
a process of domination through signification, or the creation of meaning in
order to enable. Creation of meaning refers to the actor's casting the param
eters of a context of interaction within which requests or strategies will carry
force necessary for compliance. Strategy use is the process of manipulating
an interpretive scheme or frame to guide or coerce the target's behavior; the
referent of that scheme may be a resource derived from the modality of
domination (a threat, when the persuader has power to carry it out or the
target is dependent) or from the modality of legitimation (reference to social
norms or morals as justification for the target's action). The feminist frame
work most applicable to this conceptualization would appear to be the post
modern, with its emphasis on language and meaning. Various postmodern
approaches will take different positions on whether the use of language itself
is inherently problematic for women or whether women's forms of language
are actually quite powerful, despite surface appearances to the contrary (Tannen, 1994).

Modalities. The goal of this aspect of the analysis is to apply feminist
frameworks to the resources of the modalities of domination, signification.
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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and legitimation as expressed in compliance-gaining situations. As examined
above, the modalities themselves hold implications for a feminist analysis.
Explicitness versus indirectness is one dimension that has been a focus of
the male-female differences in communication domain (Tannen, 1994).

Compliance-gaining strategies vary in the explicitness of the modality drawn
upon. For example, a direct request("Do this") does not contain in the verbal
form of the utterance a reference to a norm (legitimation) or other modality.
The situation may provide a clue, however, as to which implied modality
(e.g. domination, signification, or legitimation) constitutes the rhetorical
force: picture a supervisor directing a subordinate. In this case, the resource
apparently stems from legitimation, or the expectation that authority is in
vested in the superior (a liberal feminist position) or from domination (an
ideology of power relations involving authority-a radical or Marxist feminist
perspective).

The methods by which inference may be accomplished will involve attri
butions of intent to the persuader by the persuadee and will be determined
in part by other elements of the interpersonal system, such as closeness of
the pair and relationship history and the gender of the participants. For ex
ample, Krone, Allen, and Ludlum (1994)found that male managers are more
likely to use reward and coercive influence strategies with subordinates than
are female managers. It is expected that general domains or typologies for
relationship histories may be developed which will serve as a variable in the
analysis of effects and antecedents of compliance-gaining strategy usage,
keeping analysis at a useful level of generality. In many cases, the modality
of a tactic must be inferred from the situation or context (Pearce, 1995). In

this sense, these attributes become direct or indirect means of legitimation,
in that expectations for behavior in some contexts are normative, that is,
probable or likely.
The target will draw, in similar manner, upon available resources in the
three modalities in attempting to resist. The current focus of this paper is on
the persuader, but the relationship as a system must not be ignored, since
the interactive process which takes place during compliance-gaining and its
consequences is the basis of the compliance-gaining situation as structuration, through which the system is reproduced. Modes of resistance as well
as modes of influence carry significance for interactants' interpretations of
the relationship.
Processes of structuration. Compliance-gaining attempts bring about con
sequences that vary in their import for the relationship. These results are
conditions for the reproduction or transformation of the system that enabled
their initial production. In the compliance-gaining situation, the first level of

system reproduction or transformation is the dyad or the interpersonal rela
tionship; the second level or order is the group, organization, or society of
which the dyad is a part, and to which the dyad contributes through sustained
activity. As noted in the review of compliance-gaining literature, effects of
compliance-gaining strategy use and attempts may include altered cognitive
attributions or altered affect. Of course, the current state of the relationship
may be maintained instead of transformed, and transformation is not nec
essarily rapid. For example, on the primary, or interpersonal dyadic, level,
elements of the compliance-gaining situation may contradict aspects of the
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relational structure. A threat in the context of a "loving" relationship serves
as a denial or alteration of the meaning of the relationship. The reaction of
the target will feed back into the relationship and change the terms of inter
action. The relationship may become distressed; repeated use of threats will
tend to reproduce the pathological structure and may lead to the demise of
the relationship (whether intended or unintended). A change in the interac
tion patterns through an infusion of new understanding in regards to healthy
interpersonal behavior (i.e., nonuse of threats) may transform the pathologi
cal structure into a sound one.

Awareness of the practices of others is a legitimacy resource (discussed
further below) that may be called upon by actors in their compliance-gaining
attempts, with subsequent expected and/or unintended consequences of ac
tion in their relationships. For example, the norm of reciprocity may be ac
cessed by use of a debt strategy ("I did X for you, so do Y for me"). An
extension of this process is that habits acquired in one relationship may alter
the structures of other relationships and may serve as cross-relational re
sources. That is, if something works in one relationship, it may be tried in
another, but the results will be unpredictable. It is likely that fewer unin
tended consequences will result from the use of highly stereotyped compli
ance-gaining sequences which have been developed and solidified overtime
in the context of a relationship. Such practices may reach the status of quasiinstitutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), which tend to be reproduced rather
than altered over time.

Domains of resources. Three domains of resources are available to the

actor and specifiable through signification in the areas of domination and
legitimation in the compliance-gaining situation. Two of these resource do
mains are similar to Secord's (1982) sources of social power, which he sug
gests lie in the nature of dyadic interaction resources, that is, the personal
and interpersonal levels; the third exists in the societal structure through the
normative structure (or societal expectations for behavior). Considering the
latter source: relationships have a type of social power due to expectations
that society holds for different sorts of relationships. For example, in the
normative area, a structural set of "rules and resources" developed (and
dependent on) an interaction between the larger social definition of how the
dyad's type of relationship usually is enacted (e.g., this is how a married
couple ought to behave) constitutes resources on the social level (Argyle &
Henderson, 1985). Reference to societal norms involves legitimacy which
links the requestor to the force of society. However, relationships also have
a type of power stemming from their uniqueness outside the constraints of
the larger canopy of significance of which they are a part (Baxter, 1987).
Finally, individuals have personal power that derives from their position or
personal characteristics in relation to the other party.
The outcomes of the system impinge on the inputs in transformative ways
(Kelley, Berscheid, Christensen, Harvey, Huston, Levinger, McClintock, Peplau,
& Peterson, 1984 chapters 1 & 2) with implications for the development and
growth of relationships. The examination of interpersonal influence will serve
as a starting point and exemplar of the structuration perspective that could
later develop into a more comprehensive treatment of interpersonal relation
ship development from a structuration approach. Employing a feminist perhttps://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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spective will allow a focus on how resource limitation as well as access can
contribute to system production, reproduction, and perhaps change.
Compliance-gaining is an inherently social process. Much of the force of
institutional legitimacy derives from the very embeddedness of these shared
institutions in convention, recognized or enacted on the level of practical
consciousness. An example of how the immediate setting may be drawn
upon through language to create a situation normally defined differently (i.e.
as that of strangers) is given by Maynard and Zimmerman (1984). Their in
vestigation of the use of "setting talk" as a means of distancing or reduction
of intimacy gives a clue as to how social reality may be constructed using
the resources available in tbe current setting. Much of this may be not di
rectly thought about or motivated, being part of the day-to-day routine of
actors' lives, especially in the relationships of men and women. In some

situations, power available from an individuals's position in the relationship
may deliver more force than social norms. Those relationships with an im
balance of power (Secord, 1982) will provide more resources for use by
individuals who have more power in the relationship. Sex differences are a
primary contributor on the societal, dyadic, and individual level to unequal
distribution of resources in a relationship (Falbo & Peplau, 1980).
From each of the feminist perspectives discussed previously, women's re
sources derive from societal expectations (liberal and psychoanalytic feminist
perspectives, particularly, suggest this framing). For example, in a typical
relationship, women are expected to be more concerned with affiliation than
with power. Phillip Smith (1985) addresses this issue insightfully. Smith sug
gests that women's and men's communication resources and tactics differ.
He suggests that the feminine aspects of gender identity is concerned with
the management of interpersonal resources related to affiliation; masculine
aspects of gender identity are associated with control-related resources. That
is, women are expected to be preoccupied with management of affiliation
in interaction, but men are preoccupied with control. Therefore, women are
expected to be more adept in general at interaction in affiliative contexts
and men in situations requiring control. These expectations can be just as
powerful a force as coercion (Wood, McMahan, & Stacks, 1984).
Smith reviews studies that show expectations for women's speech to be,
for example, kind, correct, unimportant, friendly, gentle, and less character
ized by curse words. In control-related settings, men are expected to be and
perceived to be skillful, regardless of tbe verbal tactics they employ; unless
women make explicit attempts to display control-related resources, they may
not be perceived as skillful. Tbat is, perceptions of women depend on their
use of language. One common example has been women's greater use of
tag questions (compared to men). However, Smith reviews research that con
tradicts this phenomenon. Differences in use appeared to be a function of
the speech situation rather than of gender. This interpretation suggests that
perhaps the resources available to women as women are actually more
strongly derived from the setting or the situation, which is a more powerful
determinant than gender. This suggests a shift in the availability of resources
to women, perhaps due to the impact of the women's movement on actual
social behavior (an example of structuration).
Resources on the dyadic level refer to how the structure of that relationship
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has been used and interpreted idiosyncratically by the agents involved. Nor
mative dyadic resources refer to tacit understanding of normal interactive
processes holding for the two individuals which are made explicit in the
form of the request (the norm of reciprocity is a good example). Different
individuals draw upon the social resources and rules differently; these varied
"action-interpretations" result in the uniqueness of relationships.
The importance of drawing upon idiosyncratic norms lies in the implica
tion of the special quality of this particular relationship compared with "all
the rest of them" which constitute the wider society. Part of the significance
of a dyadic relationship, particularly an intimate one, may reside in its dif
ferentiated status from perceived relationships that "other people" have, or
a unique relational culture (Baxter, 1987). Hence, requests that are based on
the unique status of that particular relationship (e.g. the knowledge that no
matter how others behave, this is what we do) may carry more force than a
societal norm if the value of the relationship lies in its uniqueness, since
complying with the request strengthens the unique nature of the relationship.
The existential feminist perspective speaks to resources available to women
that derive from the particular nature of the relationship. Despite societal
expectations, a particular woman in a particular relationship may have de
veloped creative ways of empowering herself. Here, de Beauvoir's analysis
of the hetaira, or professional prostitute, in ancient Greece is informative. A
more recent example is a study of compliance-gaining between husbands
and wives (Dillard & Fitzpatrick, 1985). In this study, wives gained compli
ance twice as frequently as their husbands. From a general feminist analysis,
this is an unexpected finding if one relies simply on the conclusion of powerlessness of women on a societal level. On the individual level, however,

it is evident that particular women in particular relationships do exercise
power. There could be a confounding effect, however, within the socially
legitimated marital relationship, such that women are expected to wield con
siderable power within that relationship. In such cases the power base is not
really the idiosyncratic nature of the relationship, but rather its socially sanc
tioned form (marriage), which merely permits women in that relationship to
exercise power.

Cixous (1981) argues that women are multivocal, whereas men tend to be
direct, to the point, univocal. Another finding from the Dillard and Fitzpatrick
(1985) study suggests such a postmodern feminist analysis: husbands were
able to gain compliance most frequently through direct requests. Wives used
a multiplicity of strategies, with no one being more successful than another.
This finding supports the flexibility of women's voices. Perhaps in flexibility
there is strength.
The third type of resource is simply individual force or strength, and is
separate from the other two in that it is not explicitly social in nature. From
a feminist standpoint, however, there is no individual power that is not in
some way social-the personal is by definition social. However, there is a
level at which individual creativity can be exerted; the postfeminists admit
this when they suggest that women can "mime the mimes," or exaggerate
the expectations men have for them (Irigaray, 1985; Moi, 1985) or, in Daly's
terms, re-create old definitions for contemporary ones. In such a case, a
woman may take delight in being called a crone, and actively identify herself
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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as such. If symbolic interactionists are taken seriously, it is through individual
interpretation and projection of roles that will allow for, if not direct, others
to respond in unique ways, allowing escape from social prescriptions.
On the physical level, size and strength may serve as implicit threats (al
though typically, women are not larger than men, there are some women
who outrank their partners in this area). Use of an individually-based re
source may be effective immediately, for the short term, but carries impli
cations of independence from any social relationship. The person using an
individual strategy stands alone and is distanced by the solitary resource
applied. Use of such a strategy may serve to distance the person from social
contact. An example of this type of strategy is aggressiveness or forcing, a
type of conflict management that asserts self without regard for other. One
should maintain caution when examining different types of power use for
their individual or dyadic force. Expertise, for example, is a social resource,
since to be an expert one must be assigned that status by others. Expertise
is an invitational rather than a coercive strategy. Not all feminists would
agree, however; for example, expertise in the scientific professions has been
criticized for encouraging separation of the knower from the known (e.g.
Belenky, et. al., 1986).
The examination of individual differences such as empathy (Hunter & Boster, 1987) focus usefully on the microscopic level of analysis, revealing how
individuals may draw idiosyncratically upon societal or dyadic resources.
The implication for a feminist analysis lies in the work of Gilligan (1982),
who suggests that women are especially attuned to relational issues, and
hence may be susceptible to emotional appeals-not because women are
"emotional," but because that mode of legitimating a request may speak to
their relational concerns. This type of empirical investigation involves clas
sifying utterances and their reference to the interpersonal or social domain.
Discussion of a well-known typology of power will supplement this treat
ment of modalities. French and Raven's (1959) bases of power include co
ercive, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent power. Coercive and reward
refers to ability to influence a target's negative or positive outcomes. From
the existential feminist perspective, this is the means by which men have
controlled women. Due to their superior strength (Beauvoir, 1974), their ac
tion on the world and will to power translated into domination of women.
Women do not possess as much coercive power as men do. Reward power
may exist, however, for women who have personal resources desired by men
(e.g. beauty, sex).
Strategies based on coercive and reward power comprise aspects of the
modality of domination, since they relate to control over resources. These
resources may be of any type, including access to valued outcomes or ma
terial goods. The ability to ensure positive or negative outcomes for the target
by means of others are also resources. Specific examples include control
over a person's job, control over sexual favors, or control over information,
to cover a wide range of situations ranging from organizational to intimate.
Both interpersonal and societal domains provide resources of this type.
Legitimate power exists when the target believes the persuader has the
right to exercise influence over the target. Traditionally, women have wielded
this power in the home. However, radical feminists suggest that this apparent
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power is a sham; men continue to exercise control over the process and
product of women's reproduction, and thereby maintain power over them
legitimately.
Referent power, or Kelman's(1961) identification, refers to legitimate pow
er on the interpersonal level. Referent power exists when a target likes the
persuader and complies because of respect. A persuader may draw on ref
erent power as a societal resource if positive evaluation by an individual
with whom the target identifies is pictured as an outcome of the target's
compliance. Expertise constitutes legitimacy on the societal level, to the ex
tent that it is normative to listen to those who are knowledgeable. The suc
cessful use of expertise involves demonstrating superior knowledge such that
the target is induced to comply.
In the Victorian era, women had referent power in the area of morals and
expertise in the area of the home. In the professional arena, referent power
and expertise are problematic. The best example is in the area of expecta
tions of women managers or leaders. Women are expected to exercise the
authority that a man does, but in feminine way, which, in a catch-22, is
described as "powerless." Goldsmith (1980) points out that the rules of lan
guage are more narrowly defined for women than for men—men have great
er freedom of expression than they need and women are restricted in the
means to understand and criticize. Many stereotypes (e.g. raising the voice)
are "unwomanly" (p. 182). Therefore, women are limited with regard to the
form of expression of expertise.
Legitimate power is conceptually identical to the modality of legitimacy
on the interpersonal level, but can be extended to include the societal level.
A situation may be defined through clever signification in such a way as to
infuse with legitimacy the request of the asker. In fact, much more force will
be accorded that request backed by social legitimacy. Actors recognize this
force; in fact, Schmitt (1964) reports that moral obligation was considered
more likely to be used as a persuasive strategy in situations in which the
target was not believed by the persuader to be morally obligated. In this
manner, legitimacy may be created. Since social institutions have a longer
history of enactment than a relationship, the force of the social system may
be greater and applied more often. For example, the reciprocity norm may
be invoked with success (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1961).

In the compliance-gaining situation, through the modality of an interpre
tive scheme in the communication interaction, either domination or legiti
mation is portrayed as the signified intention of the persuader. Legitimation
may disguise the operation of facility (domination) such that it appears nor
mative (this has been one of the major statements of feminist theory with
regard to institutions such as the church, as well as the means by which
women are coopted into compliance with male exercise of dominance). The
enactment of this scheme will feed back into the system as an acceptable
way of behaving, creating a greater probability of that specific type of action
in a subsequent situation. It is in this way, according to the radical feminist
perspective, that male hegemony continues.
Summary

The purpose of this paper was to sketch, in broad terms, suggestions for
an integration of structuration theory, feminist perspectives, and compliancehttps://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol32/iss1/1
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gaining findings. Each of the three perspectives offers heuristic insight to the
others; the next paragraphs review some of the benefits of integration. Some

of the suggestions were covered in the paper; others are a legacy for future
scholarship.

Feminist theorizing accomplishes the following work for compliance gain

ing. It provides a way to rethink the domain from a specific critical perspec
tive, and it may offer new ways of conceptualizing power and influence or

fresh explanations for the findings: that is, it may offer alternative places to
"look" amongst compliance-gaining phenomena for theoretically and prac
tically interesting insights. For structuration theory, feminist theorizing pro
vides the following benefits. It offers a specific framework/domain in which
structuration can be shown to operate. Furthermore, especially when applied
to a specific collection of empirical findings (such as compliance-gaining
research), it provides concrete examples of structuration concepts, such as
resources and modalities.

Structuration theory does the following work for compliance gaining re
search. It channels these findings' implications beyond the interpersonal

area, providing a way to connect to larger societal issues. Structuration the
ory, like feminist theory, can reframe compliance-gaining theory and research
in a heuristically provocative way, as demonstrated in the preceding discus
sion. For multiple feminist theories, structuration theory can provide a com
mon language in which to structure both their criticisms and expectations
for change. That is, the concepts of resources, rules, and modalities of struc
turation can be used to show how the action of oppression works (though

these concepts must be cast in the language of each theory's assumptions).
Therefore, structuration theory may allow for judgment among competing

feminist theories (e.g. some may be shown to offer more insight than others
from this perspective), though this task was not attempted in this essay.
Several strands of feminist theory, as demonstrated above, are amenable
as a framework for the application of structuration principles to women's

communication experience. Feminist perspectives, from liberal through rad
ical and postmodern approaches, were shown here to focus on the resources
available to women in interaction. Often, the resources available to women
are different from those available to men. The cause of the difference in

resources may be unequal laws (liberal feminism), capital-production rela
tions (Marxist feminism), or even lack of access to a nonpatriarchal language

(postmodern feminism)(Tong, 1989). Each of these approaches sheds differ
ent light on the precursors of structuration, that is, resources that women
have access to and may draw upon in order to accomplish various goals in
the social world. Certainly this type of analysis can extend beyond the com
pliance-gaining literature into other domains of interpersonal communica
tion.

Compliance-gaining research does the following work for structuration
theory. It can offer empirical tests of its findings as well as specific instances
where structuration can be seen to operate. Compliance-gaining findings also

offer insight to feminist perspectives. They allow exploration of a specific
area of interpersonal interaction (on the individual level) from feminist per

spectives and allow support for, critique of, and renovation of feminist tenets
and future scholarly endeavors. In most feminist analysis, the "action takes
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place at a general societal level, rather than at the individual level (criticism

has been leveled at some feminist theories for just that reason). Integrating
strands of feminist theory with a structuration approach to social phenomena
on the individual level (compliance-gaining research) will allow a bridging
of these levels. In the process, such research will answer calls for a greater
focus on women's communication (e.g. Wood, et. al., 1984).

The importance of the study of the interpersonal exercise of power and its
interaction with dyadic and more comprehensive social structure from a fem

inist perspective lies in the nature of the activity of compliance-gaining: the
exercise of domination and power. There is no more important aspect of the
constitution of society than how relations of power are carried out on the

levels of the individual and of the group, especially with regard to women
and other less empowered groups. One need only think of the historical
abuse of women and others with fewer societal and political resources re
sulting from pathological power processes to recall the importance of investigating power phenomena. The importance of maintaining a dualistic focus
is that individual behavior does carry over to society through interaction.
Even at a very early age these processes are begun. Cicourel (1981) reviews
the importance of the role of language use to children's socialization, es

pecially in the resolution of conflict and misunderstandings, including dis
putes during play (which include compliance-gaining involving peers), to the
child's socialization. Therefore, continued feminist examination of compli
ance-gaining behavior as structuration is useful and necessary.
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ARGUMENTATION AND FEMINISMS:
TOWARD A DIALECTICAL PARTNERSHIP

Jeffery Thomas Bile
Ohio University
Amazon, anarcho, black, cultural, "do me," ecological, erotic, existen
tialist, liberal, libertarian, lesbian, Marxist, materialist, moderate, postmod

ern, post-structural, proactive, psychoanalytic, radical, separatist, socialist,
third-world—by now it should be clearly understood that feminism is not
univocal. Instead, feminism "is not one, but many, theories and perspectives"

(Tong, 1989, p. 1). It can be thought of as an "umbrella concept" (Warren,
1993, p. 122) since "there is no single definition of 'feminism' or 'feminist'"
(Bowen & Wyatt, 1993b, p. 2). Given the plurality of feminism, it is more

accurate to speak of feminisms (Bowen & Wyatt, 1993b, p. 11; Hekman,
1990, p.2). Warhol & Herndyl (1991) concur:
We've used the plural form "feminisms," rather than "feminism," to acknowl
edge the diversity of motivation, method, and experience among feminist
academics. From the outside "feminism" may appear monolithic, unified, or

singularly definable. The more intimately one becomes acquainted with fem
inist criticism, however, the more one sees the multiplicity of approaches
and assumptions inside the movement,(p. x)

Although feminism welcomes many viewpoints, distinctions among fem
inisms often reflect fundamental and sometimes incommensurable differ

ences. Virginia Olessen (1994) explains that "there are many feminisms,
hence many views, some conflicting" (p. 158). Lisa McLaughlin (1995)
agrees that the "unified front suggested by 'feminist' and 'feminism' can be
misleading" since these terms "disguise an unharmonious set of philoso
phies" (p. 148). Bowen & Wyatt(1993b) observe that "many times the items
in the catalog of feminist thought seem to contradict one another" (p. 11).
Thus, any temptation to conflate these feminisms should be steadfastly re
sisted. As Audre Lourde (1993) cautions: "It is a particular academic arro

gance to assume any discussion of feminist theory without examining our
many differences" (p. 10).

Despite enormous differences between individual feminists and among
multiple forms of feminism, most feminists embrace one or more of several
core assumptions. For example, feminist thought tends to coalesce around a
few central goals. In this essay, I will contrast three distinct feminist projects.
Jeff Bile is a graduate associate at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701. He would
like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The author ap

preciates the efforts of Roger Aden, Christy Coons, and especially David Descutner,
all of Ohio University, who provided invaluable assistance with earlier versions of
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I label these feminism', feminism^ and feminism'. The focus of feminism' is

biological sex (male/female); it opposes the domination of women by men
and advocates equality (or superiority) for women. The focus of feminism' is
sociological gender (feminine/masculine); it challenges the domination of

masculine ideology and seeks the equality (or superiority) of traditionally
"feminine" ideals. The focus of feminism' is domination per se; it rejects the
ideology of domination and all its manifestations (sexism, genderism, racism,
classism, ageism, heterosexism, ableism, etc.).

Before proceeding, three caveats seem appropriate. First, these categories
are an attempt to describe ideology rather than people. It would be inappro
priate to attempt to essentialize any individual feminist according to this

typology. Nevertheless, arguments proceeding from feminist theory regularly
adopt one or more of these premises. Second, these categories are not offered
as exhaustive or discrete. There may be feminist approaches not represented
here, and it certainly is possible for a feminist argument to subscribe to more
than one of these assumptions. The third caveat is that these categories do
not strictly correspond to what has been labeled first, second, and third
"wave" feminism. While the parallels with first and second wave feminism
are striking, it is fair to say that some authors have defined "third-wave"
feminism quite differently than I conceptualize feminism'.
After further distinguishing these approaches to feminism, I will do three
things. First, I will contrast two models of communication and examine var
ious feminist approaches for their congruence with these models. Next, I will
review feminist research in rhetorical theory and suggest connections to ar

gumentation studies. Finally, I will distinguish various approaches to argu
mentation and examine implications of these perspectives for feminism. Fol

lowing this exploration, I will draw some conclusions and suggest future
directions for communication studies. I invite the reader to travel with me

on this journey, and to see, as I see, important connections between argu
mentation theory and some approaches to feminism. I intend to suggest that
a communication-argumentation-feminism partnership has much to offer all

three foci of inquiry and important implications for pedagogy.
Feminisms
Feminism^

Feminism' corresponds closely to what has been called "first-wave" fem
inism which was "by and large a liberal feminist reform movement." Liberal

feminists sought sexual equality within the existing social structure. Since it

embraced existing societal values, "liberal feminism asked women to adopt
a male orientation" as a precondition to equal treatment (Taylor and Rich
ardson, 1993, p. 534-5). First-wave feminists "attempted to fit women un

critically into a masculine pattern of life and a masculine model of humanity
'This project opposes the domination of women by men and advocates equality
(or superiority) for women.

'This project challenges the domination of masculine ideology and seeks cultural
equality (or superiority) of traditionally "feminine" ideals.
'This project opposes domination per se regardless of manifestation.
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and culture"(Plumwood, 1993, p. 27). In short, first-wave (typically liberal)
feminists were interested in "making women more like men"(Dervin 1987,

p. 110). Rosemarie Tong (1989) explains that first-wave feminists felt that "to
free themselves from oppression, women who are ready, willing, and able
to develop masculine traits should be permitted and even required to do so"

(p. 103). These feminists displayed "a tendency to accept male values as
human values" (Tong, 1989, p. 31).

While first-wave feminism is most closely associated with liberal feminism,
"the attempt to fit women into a masculine ideal of selfhood goes beyond
liberal feminism" and is also found in some forms of socialist and Marxist-

humanist feminism (Plumwood, 1993, p. 27). Additionally, although "radi
cal" feminists are generally classified as "second-wave" feminists, some fit
our definition of feminism'. Early radical feminists felt that sexism had been
rationalized on the basis of supposedly "essential" biological differences be
tween the sexes. They attempted to obviate these "natural" differences by
encouraging women to emulate traditionally "masculine" behavior.
In short, while liberal feminists typify feminism', one need not adopt the
liberal label to subscribe to the central premises of feminism'. Feminists'
embrace the values of the dominant culture. They accept the man-made
institutions of the existing order but seek a larger role for women within
those institutions.

Feminisnf

Some early radical feminists embraced masculinity, but others were highly
critical of it. These later radical feminists joined with cultural feminists, and
others, in a chorus of voices critiquing excessive valorization of the mascu
line. Val Plumwood (1993) explains that this feminine-identified feminism

"has been a major rival to and critic of the feminism of uncritical equality."
Feminism-^ is associated with "second-wave" feminism. If first-wave feminism

"rejects the ideals of feminine character," then second-wave feminists reject
masculine ideals (p. 30). Primarily associated with cultural feminists and
radical feminists, the rejection of ideals thought of as masculine also gives
rise to several themes in socialist feminism, ecological feminism, eco-feminism, and some feminist theories of nonviolence.

In feminism^ the central goal for women "is not equal participation or

absorption in such a male dominant culture but rather subversion, resistance
and replacement"(p. 30). Second-wave feminism is sometimes equated with
"cultural" feminism because, as Zimmerman (1994) explains, it calls for the
creation of a "counterculture to replace the misogynist, hierarchical, domi

neering, violent, militaristic, death-denying culture of patriarchy" (p. 236).
"Despite disagreements, most cultural feminists agree in promoting a culture
that valorizes the relational, other-oriented, nurturing traits that traditionally

have been the most highly developed in women" (p. 237). Like cultural
feminists, many radical feminists oppose man-made society and instead sup

port traditionally feminine values. Taylor & Richardson (1993) observe that
"radical feminism is a transformation politics engaged in a fight against fe
male disadvantage and the masculinization of culture" (p. 536).
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Feminism'

Second-wave feminism's emphasis on women's difference from men had
the unintended effect of implying the essential sameness of women, "but
growing emphasis on 'difference,' especially when abetted by postmodern
theory, began to fragment the very concept of women and introduced other
"differences"—such as race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orientation" (Zim
merman, 1994, p. 283). One truly revolutionary implication of this feminist

criticism is that it "undermined the old dualism of men-as-oppressors and
women-as-oppressed. Women, too, can be the oppressors" (p. 238). Taylor
& Richardson (1993) explain that the "recognition that the circumstances of
women's oppression differ has given way to a new feminist paradigm that
views race, class, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality, as interlocking systems of
oppression" (p. 538).

The focus on an interlocking system of domination is essence of feminism'
as presented here. Concentrating on the root (domination) rather than the
branches (i.e., sexism or genderism) empowered feminists with a transcen

dent understanding of the unity of oppression. Feminism' rejects the reductionistic, additive, either- or analysis of oppression in favor of a holistic,
synthesizing, both- and model. Collins (1991) explains: "Additive models of
oppression are firmly rooted in the either/or dichotomous thinking of Euro
centric masculinist thought" (p. 225). Collins continues:
Embracing a both/and conceptual stance moves us from additive separate
systems approaches to oppression and toward what I now see as the more
fundamental issue of the social relations of domination. Race, class, and

gender constitute axes of oppression that characterize black women's expe
rience within a more generalized matrix of domination. Other groups may
encounter other dimensions of the matrix, such as sexual orientation, relig
ion, and age, but the overarching relationship is one of domination. ... (p.
226)

What Collins (1991) has called the "matrix of domination;" Riane Eisler

(1987) labels "the dominator model;" bell hooks refers to as the "politic"
(1989) or "ideology" (1981) of domination; and Karen Warren (1993) de

scribes as a "logic of domination." Opposition to the matrix/

model/politic/ideology/logic of domination is more basic than opposing mul
tiple distinct manifestations (sexism, genderism, heterosexism, racism, classism, ageism, ableism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, etc.). What feminist' ap

proaches have in common is an understanding that apparently distinct forms
of oppression are rooted in a single system premised on power-over domi
nation. Eeminists' acknowledge these connections and critique oppression
at its source. Eeminism', then, subsumes the concerns of feminism'^^.

Having distinguished three lines of feminist thought, we now proceed to
examination of two models of communication and their implications for
these diverse feminisms.
Communication Models and Eeminist Theories
Communication Models

In this section I will distinguish two attitudes regarding human commu
nication. The first, which I label unilateral monologic, is modeled on the
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received view of human relations in Western culture. It is premised on an
ultimately isolated, alienated, disconnected, separated, and narrowed sense
of self in competition with others. The other model, which I will label bilat
eral dialogic, proceeds from the emerging view that understands reality as
relational, connected, integrated, and holistic.
Philosopher Martin Buber's examination of two central human relation
ships, l-lt and l-Thou, grounds the concept of communication as monologue
and dialogue. The monologic stance regards the audience as less important
than the rhetor. Johannesen (1983) elaborates:
The l-It relation, or monologic communication, is characterized by varying
degrees of self-centeredness, deception, pretense, display, appearance, arti
fice, using, profit, unapproachableness, seduction, domination, exploitation,
and manipulation. ... A person employing monologue seeks to command,
coerce, manipulate, conquer, dazzle, deceive, or exploit, (p. 52-3).

In communication as monologue, the rhetor's attitude toward the audience
is superiority, perhaps even contempt. The monologic communicator seeks
dominance. In exercising power over the audience, unilateral communica
tion verges on force. Brockreide's (1972) metaphor of rhetorical rape is con
sistent with the assumptions of unilateral communication. It is not my inten
tion to imply that many would explicitly defend this model in its nakedness.
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that we live in a culture that disguises,
rationalizes, and normalizes communication premised on individualistic
"survival of the fittest" values.

Bilateral dialogue stands in sharp contrast to unilateral monologue. Johan
nesen (1983) concludes that authenticity, inclusion, confirmation, presentness, a spirit of mutual equality, and a supportive psychological climate typify
"the major attitudinal dimensions which most scholars writing on dialog,
under various labels, identify" (p. 49).
In the l-thou or dialogic relationship, the attitudes and behavior of each
communication participant are characterized by such qualities as mutuality,
open-heartedness, directness, honesty, spontaneity, frankness, lack of pre
tense, nonmanipulative intent, communion, intensity and love. ... The es
sential movement in dialogue, according to Buber, is turning toward, out
going to, and reaching for the other. And a basic element in dialogue is
"seeing the other" or "experiencing the other side." A person also does not

forego his or her own convictions and views, but strives to understand those
of others and avoids imposing his or her own on others. (Johannesen, 1983,
p. 47-8)

A dialogic relationship is bilateral, reciprocal, and respectful. The mutu
ality of the bilateral relationship is quite different from the power-over stance
adopted by the rhetorical rapist, johannesen (1983) explains:

A bilateral or power parity relationship is sought by the rhetorical lover who
views the audience as persons rather than objects or victims. The attitudes
of speaker toward audience characterizing the rhetorical lover are equality,
respect, willingness to risk self-change, openness to new ideas and argu
ments, and a genuine desire to promote free choice in the audience,(p. 5960).

The bilateral rhetor is open minded and hearted, johannesen (1983) con
cludes that "bilaterality includes mutuality of personal and intellectual risk.
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openness to the possibility of self-change, and openness to scrutiny by oth
ers" (p. 61). Finally, we should note that johannesen observes that dialogue
is premised on an "argumentative stance" (p. 59) while monologue is fre
quently equated with "persuasion and propaganda" (p. 52).
Feminist Theories

Since the monologic model rationalizes the rhetor's exercise of power over
the audience and their ultimate domination, feminists^ should reject mono
logue in favor of dialogue which assumes a bilateral relationship between
rhetor and audience. Ascertaining the reactions of feminists'^^ will require
further elaboration. We would expect feminists^ to embrace "women's ways"
and to reject traditionally masculine behavior. We would anticipate the op
posite from feminists^ To predict these feminist's reactions requires a deeper
understanding of traditionally feminine and masculine thought. This distinc
tion (masculine/feminine) is not intended to biologically essentialize. While
one would expect an empirical correlation between males and "masculine"
behavior in a given culture, it does not follow that men are masculine (in
the western sense) in all places or at all times. In fact, substantial evidence
suggests enormous cross-cultural variability in gender roles.
A major project of feminism has been examination of the western masculinist philosophical-scientific worldview. A central aspect of this worldview
is radical dualism. At least since Descartes, dichotomous thinking has been
highly valued in Western thought. Many dualisms are manifest in Western
culture, with perhaps the most central one being the egoic I/it. The power
of this basic dichotomy was substantially strengthened by the Newtonian
world view which is "rooted in the binary masculine psychology of discrete
self versus dominated other" (Donovan, 1992, p. 180).
Feminists have opposed this separation. Summarizing the work of Iris Mur

doch, Donovan concludes that "the l-it of Newtonian science must give way
to a more comprehensive vision that accepts the 'thou-ness' of life"(p. 182).
Donovan (1992) argues that this "new physics" offers a compelling vision
of relational organization. "Under such conditions the old dualisms—eitheror, l-it, subject-object—are no longer operative. What is needed is a holistic,
contextual, both- and approach to reality" (Donovan, 1992, p. 183). She
continues:

The new vision of the universe that is emerging is no longer of an Other that
operates in predictable, mechanical fashion, but of a contextual network in

which every discrete entity is defined relative to its environment and subject
to positional relativity of the observer. Under this perspective black and
white, l-it dualism is no longer possible,(p. 180)

Feminist scholars have observed that women are more predisposed to in
tegrated thinking. Karen Foss (1989) summarizes some distinctions of "fem
inine" thought:
Women's reality is characterized by such features as a sense of interdepend
ence and connection with others and with the world, a recognition of the
inevitability and value of a subjective approach to knowledge; an acceptance
of self-questioning and paradox that the world does not need to be "fixed"
in place and fully resolved in order to have an understanding of it; a fusion
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of the public and the private realms; an egalitarian use of power; and a focus
on process rather than product, (p. 2)

A central distinction observed by feminists concerns attitudes about care
(Tronto, 1989). Carol Gilligan's {1982} research on psychological develop
ment in women found that while men tend to assume an autonomous self,

women are more likely to embrace an "ethic of care" characterized by a
commitment to relationships. Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule
(1986) found that women are more likely to prefer relationships that are
egalitarian, reciprocal and collaborative, rather than hierarchical, dominat
ing, and competitive.
The foregoing discussion should allow us to draw some initial conclusions
regarding feminism and communication. We can anticipate that those iden
tifying with feminism^ would embrace bilateral dialogue given its consistency
with feminine consciousness as traditionally conceived. We would also ex
pect them to oppose monologue given its congruence with traditional mas
culine rationality and philosophical assumptions. Finally, we would expect
feminists' to embrace monologue for the same reasons. We now turn to an
examination of scholarship that has explicitly addressed issues of feminism
and communication.

Feminist Communication Scholarship and Rhetorical Theory

Feminist scholarship in communication" is now "proving vital to the dis
cipline and is beginning to receive official recognition" (Bowen & Wyatt,
1993a, p. viii). Celeste Condit (1993) reports that the majority of this work
has been in the realm of interpersonal communication. She fears that femi
nists have chosen to "abandon the study of rhetoric" and warns that to do
so is "to abandon an important arena of power" (p. 215). Given its relative
isolation from feminist criticism, it is small wonder Edward Corbett (1990)

contends that "rhetoric is one of the most patriarchal of all the academic
disciplines" (p. 577).

While relatively little feminist rhetorical scholarship exists, much of what
does retains the masculinist biases of feminism' (Campbell, 1988, 1989;
Glenn, 1993). Campbell (1988), for example, argues that feminists should

recover the speeches of women, include such speeches in our courses, and
offer courses on women in history. For Campbell, feminism is centrally con
cerned with combating biological sexism. Her essay does not seem to ac
knowledge feminism beyond feminism'. Cirksena and Cuklanz (1992) agree
that the work of "reclaiming the history of women public speakers" is prem
ised on "liberal feminist ideals" (p. 23).

The additive strategy ("add women and stir") is now widely criticized by
feminist scholars, jansen (1993), for example, notes that "the new feminist
epistemologies assume that any strategy that simply adds women's contri" Feminist approaches to the study of communication have been taken, for example,
by Blair, Brown and Baxter (1994), Cirksena and Cuklanz (1992), Deming, (1989),
Dervin (1987), Fine (1988), K. Foss (1989), Gregg (1987), Kramarae (1989), Lay

(1991), McLaughlin (1995), Rakow(1986, 1989, 1992), Self (1988), Shields and Der
vin (1993), Spitzack and Carter (1988), Treichler and Wartella (1986), and Wood
(1988, 1992).
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butions to existing equations will not produce the necessary corrective" (p.
145). The old structures of knowledge are patriarchal constructions which is
why "these structures cannot support integration of feminist ideas within
existing paradigms and definitions of the problematic of communication
studies" (p. 139). Biesecker (1992) argues that retrieving women's texts is
insufficient because "the standards according to which any speech is as
sessed are constructed on the basis of male attributes, capacities, and modes
of activity" (p. 88).
Recently, rhetorical scholars have argued that feminist studies should move
beyond the retrieval and situating of women's texts. Biesecker (1992) calls
for a "more radical approach" which would "uncramp the orthodoxy of
rhetorical theory" (p. 88). Balbus (1984), Condit,(1993), Green (1993), Grif
fin (1993), McPhail (1991) and Shepherd (1992) employ at least some fem
inist^ theorizing. None of these scholars, however, seem to venture into the
integrated critique of domination envisioned in feminism^.
An exception to the general tendency of rhetorical scholars to ignore fem
inism^ is the recent work of Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin (1992, 1995). They
report (1995) that a recognition of the "patriarchal bias that undergirds most
theories of rhetoric is growing steadily" in the field of communication (p. 2).
Specifically, they decry the "positive value" traditional rhetorical theories
accord to "dominating others"(p. 2), which they contend constitutes a "rhet
oric of patriarchy, reflecting its values of change, competition and domina
tion" (p. 4). In their 1992 essay, Foss and Griffin develop a rhetorical theory
from the writings of the feminist Starhawk. Starhawk's system contrasts two
rhetorics: the rhetoric of inherent value and the rhetoric of domination. The
rhetoric of inherent value (ROIV) favors interconnection and is rooted in a

respect for all living things and the ecosystem on which they depend. This
is contrasted with the rhetoric of domination (ROD)—"the current state of

patriarchy, an unnatural state that oppresses and destroys"—which embraces
hierarchy and manipulation (p. 335).
In "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric" (1995),

Foss & Griffin call for rhetoric which "offers an invitation to understanding
to enter another's world to better understand an issue and the individual who

holds a particular perspective on it" (p. 13). That the invitational approach
is plainly bilateral and dialogic can be seen in their prescription that "in
presenting a particular perspective, the invitational rhetor does not judge or
denigrate others' perspectives but is open to" them (p. 5).
In an invitational approach, the rhetor's ideas are not privileged. Benhabib
calls this "the principal of egalitarian reciprocity" and suggests that "each
has the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics,
to ask for reflections about the presuppositions of the conversation, etc." (in
Foss & Griffin, 1995, p. 12). Like bilateral dialogue, invitational rhetoric is
open, as "no subject matter is off limits, and all presuppositions can be
challenged" (p. 12). An argument offered "represents an initial, tentative
commitment to that perspective—one subject to revision as a result of the
interaction" (p. 8). Participants adopt empathic attitudes in attempting to
understand offered perspectives. Central in such a rhetoric are openness and
mutual respect. In this regard, invitational rhetoric is also dialogic.
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A critical dimension of the offering of a perspective, in whatever form it takes,
is a willingness to yield. Not unlike Buber's (1965) notion of the 'l-Thou'
relationship, the basic movement of a willingness to yield is a turning toward
the other, (p. 7)

Foss & Griffin (1995) discuss several implications of a theory of invitational
rhetoric but one seems especially relevant to the present investigation. In
traditional theory, "rhetors tend to see their audiences as opponents and
sometimes may be tempted to engage in questionable ethical practices to
win their 'battles' with them" (p. 15). An invitational rhetorical theory "may
contribute to the efforts of communication scholars who are working to de
velop models of cooperative, nonadversarial, and ethical communication"

(p. 15). Foss & Griffin cite new scholarship in argumentation as exemplifying
such efforts. They specifically discuss Josina Makau's work on cooperative
argumentation and Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's argumentation schol
arship which seeks to "create an open and free exchange and responsible
participation in cooperative dialogic communication"(p. 15). Foss and Grif
fin clearly embrace bilateral dialogue as feminist and challenge argumen
tation scholars to extend the work begun in their proposal for an invitational
rhetoric.

Foss and Griffin explicitly link an invitational rhetoric to feminist and ar
gumentation theories. However, further research is required to understand
how argumentation theory can extend the proposal for an invitational rhet
oric, and how feminist theories (including invitational rhetoric) address con
cerns raised in the study of argumentation.
Advocacy, Argumentation, and Dialectic
Advocacy and Argumentation

One might expect feminists^^^ to oppose argumentation. The up/down,
dominant/defeated, winner/loser aspects of "argument" (as frequently ex

perienced), certainly present difficulties for those identifying with feminism^
These features, as well as the aggression and conflict associated with arguing,
should be a concern for those committed to feminism^. Nevertheless, these

problems need not hinder feminists^" from embracing argumentation. Josina
Makau (1990) explains:
There are at least two approaches to argumentation. Competitive argumen
tation focuses on winning something, from an audience's vote to a debate

prize. Cooperative argumentation focuses on the shared goal of finding the
best answer or making the best decision, (p. 48)
Certain "competitive" strategies have no purpose in argumentative con

texts in which arguers cooperate in the critical testing of arguments. The
competition of ideas need not become a competition of egos. Sharon Blinn
(1992), holds that cooperative argumentation "rests on the mutual respect
imparted to all participants in the dialogue" (p. 6). She insists that "practical
wisdom to guide reasonable, ethical action has little to do with winning and
losing and more to do with adjusting and adapting to a world bound to
gether" in a web of relationships (p. 10).
In short, a cooperative approach to argumentation might obviate many of
the reservations that feminists^*'^ might otherwise have regarding argumen-
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tation. Further elaboration of the concept is warranted. I believe much tran
sitional insight may be gleaned from the dialectical perspective on argument,
and it is to this topic that I now turn.
Argumentation and Dialectic

"All arguments can be regarded as rhetorical, dialectical, and logical phe
nomenon"(Wenzel, 1990, p. 9). Wenzel (1990) notes that the interests that
motivate rhetoric, dialectic and logic are; "the interest in adapting speeches
to audiences and situations; the interest in cooperative methods for decision

making; and the interest in developing standards for rational judgment"(p.
9). These distinctions can also be used as perspectives from which to evaluate
argument products. Hample (1990), for example, explains:
From the rhetorical perspective, a scholar wishes to know how effective an
argument is and why. Logical criticism is concerned about the validity or
strength of an argument. From the dialectical point of view, you might won
der whether an argument reflects all that is known about a topic, and whether
an argument has proceeded in a way free enough to permit all reasonable
contributions to be properly evaluated, (p. 298)

In brief, the rhetorical perspective is interested in advocative effectiveness,
in the successful influence of the audience. The logical perspective is focused
on the soundness of argument, its validity or strength, and the acceptability,
relevance, and sufficiency of evidence. Finally, the dialectical perspective is
committed to interaction that facilitates the best possible decision by en
couraging well-informed evaluation resulting from candid, critical and com
prehensive discussion. These distinctions deserve further elaboration.
The rhetorical view promotes successful influence over the audience by
an advocate. It is interested in the speaker's discovering the available means
of exercising power over the audience. The rhetorical perspective asks arguers to adapt advocacy for impact (Hample, 1990; Warnick & Inch, 1989;
Wenzel, 1990). "Whatever works" summarizes the highly instrumental rhe
torical perspective. In short, the rhetorical perspective would embrace uni
lateral monologue as "good" argumentation. Not surprisingly, I predict that
those embracing feminism^^^ would reject the rhetorical perspective on ar
gumentation as proceeding from masculinist premises and promoting powerover.

Nor would feminists^ likely subscribe to the logical perspective of argu
ment evaluation. A critic operating from a logical position is interested in
rationality, soundness, validity, and evidence (Hample, 1990; Warnick &
Inch, 1989; Wenzel, 1990). Several feminists have questioned the appropri
ateness of strictly "logical" standards of argument evaluation (Blinn, 1992).
Strict rationality is inconsistent with feminine valuation of emotion and in
tuition. Exclusively logical criteria of evaluation ask the evaluator to divorce
herself from the wholeness of her humanity (Makau, 1990).
The dialectical approach is interested in communication that promotes the
best possible decision-making (Warnick & Inch, 1989; Hample, 1990; Wen
zel, 1990). Wenzel (1990) summarizes criteria for dialectical communica
tion:
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Good argument-as-procedure should measure up to the "four Cs." Good
dialectical argumentation depends on the arguers being cooperative in fol
lowing appropriate rules and committing themselves to the common purpose
of good decision-making. Good argumentation is comprehensive in dealing
with the subject matter as thoroughly as possible. Good argumentation is
candid in making ideas clear and getting them out in the open for exami
nation. Finally sound argumentation is critical in its commitment to basing
decisions on the most rigorous testing of positions the circumstances allow,
(p. 24)

Dialectical thought is characterized by the interrelationship of participants.
While advocates may have formed tentative and conditional opinions, they
remain radically open to the possibility of altering their original position in
response to feedback (Warren 1984). Dialectical participants are therefore
empowered with one another.
The distinctions among rhetorical, logical, and dialectical perspectives can

be further unpacked. Both the rhetorical and logical perspectives privilege
unilateral communication. The argument "source" transmits a message to a

"target" which "receives" it. The source need not seek nor value audience
response. This contrasts with the bilateral dialectical perspective. While the
dialectical perspective is dialogical, both rhetorical and logical perspectives

are monological in assuming that one "truth" preexists and should prevail.
From the rhetorical perspective, the preexisting "truth"(from the rhetor's state
of mind) is the only thing that matters. From the logical perspective, truth is
assumed to be "objective" and demonstrable. Contrasted with the subjective
truth of rhetoric and the objective truth of logic, the dialectical perspective
seeks an intersubjective decision. Finally, the rhetorical perspective adapts

to the psychological state of the audience to secure adherence; the logical
perspective demands audience compliance with omnilogical truth; and the
dialectical perspective seeks audience participation in dialogical decisions.
The dialectical approach, then, epitomizes the stance of bilateral dialogue.

It also proceeds from traditionally feminine values. As such, we might predict
overwhelming support from feminists^ and strong support from feminist' for
a dialectical approach to advocative communication. Conversely, we can
expect that feminist'^' would strongly oppose the rhetorical perspective on
argument as unilateral monologue.
Conclusions and Beginnings

Feminist theorists share many interests with argumentation scholars work

ing to develop dialectical or cooperative argument, and both argumentation
scholars and feminist theorists proceed from many of the same premises as
communication ethicists who advocate bilateral dialogue. With one foot

planted firmly in feminist theory and the other in argumentation studies, we
can move forward to examine the implications of a new feminist dialectical
partnership in communication studies.

What implications would such a partnership entail? Initially, our approach
to teaching the argumentation/debate course would need immediate rethink
ing. Makau (1992) argues that the cooperative argumentation and debate
course would teach students to approach debate from the standpoint of the

judge rather than the advocate: "Training students to be judicious means
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teaching them to be open, to seek understanding, and to reason with care
and responsibility; this is in sharp contrast to the patriarchal goals of teaching
students to become effective advocates" (p. 83). In the cooperative argu
mentation course, students are evaluated not on "how badly they beat their
opponent" but on how well their arguments contribute to the quality of the
audience's decision-making. A goal in competitive debate is to separate arguers into winners and losers, but as Blinn (1992) explains:
Standards for cooperative argumentation are Intended to lead to a better-

Informed audience, one who has a deeper understanding of multi-faceted
Issues form several perspectives, one who can make critical judgments and
act on those judgments In short, an audience who Is a "winner." (p. 4)

Beyond the argumentation course, a feminist dialectical partnership would
also have implications for forensics pedagogy^ It saddens many of us long
associated with academic debate to realize, as Johannesen (1983) does, that

debate is frequently seen as a "typical example" of monologue disguised as
dialogue (p. 52) and that the "attitudes of rhetorical rape often manifest
themselves in ... competitive intercollegiate debate" (p. 59). It's time to ask
what role directors, coaches, and judges have in perpetuating these outlooks
and what they might do to transform such a promising activity. Forensics
educators might reinterpret "the better job of debating" in more bilateraldialectical-feminist terms, like those proposed for the cooperative argumen
tation course. Debaters might be rewarded for facilitating good decision
making, rather than for "crushing" their opponents.
Forensics educators might also question what dialectical purpose is
achieved in the practice of assigning unilateral rights or responsibilities to
the affirmative or negative in academic debates. A unilateral affirmative bur

den of proof, unilateral negative presumption, unilateral affirmative right to
define, and unilateral negative responsibility to clash are typical components
of contemporary paradigms of academic debate. Why unilateral? Why, for
example, must the negative refute a specific "case" unilaterally imposed on
them by the affirmative while the affirmative is free to affirm any part of the
resolution? Must debate be so estranged from "the principle of egalitarian
responsibility" and the idea of "symmetrical rights?" These questions need
rethinking and a handful of debaters have begun to do so. If judges and
coaches could be nudged out of traditional and "comfortable" ways of doing
things, a more dialectical form of academic debate might be realized.
We should also consider extending the value of bilateral dialogue beyond
the debate context. Monological, unilateral, control-based models havedom5 Given the more general thrust of the bulk of my manuscript one reader of an
earlier version of this essay wondered why, in my conclusion, I "turn on academic
debate which is a game not a real argument." I choose to extend my critique to
debate because I agree with Herbeck (1990) that "the divergency of debate from
argumentation is problematic" (p. 9). Trapp (1993) is correct, I believe, in observing
that "debate is in trouble because its practitioners have lost their focus on argumen
tation" (p. 23). Debate is real argument. In fact. Goodnight (1981) argues that aca
demic debate "is a paradigm case of argumentation" and he calls for the re-union of

argumentation and debate theory (p. 416). If debate is a game it is an argumentative
game, and so, "we ought to take an argumentative perspective on academic debate"
(Trapp, 1993, p. 24).
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inated communication studies. Klumpp and Holihan (1989) argue that our
field has been preoccupied with a managerial approach that sought to "dif
ferentiate dialectic and rhetoric" (p. 88). Deetz(1994) contends that the field
has promoted "control-centered conceptions and research methods" such as
managerial rhetoric and compliance gaining (p. 6). Shepherd (1992) agrees
that our field has been dominated by a view of communication as "persua
sion, influence, and control" (p. 204). These control-based conceptions ob
viously fail the test of feminism^^^ since they value the rhetor's power over
the audience.

Feminist dialectical criteria might also contribute to more "critical" modes
of rhetorical criticism. Scholars could apply these new critical tools to an

expanded pool of artifacts by understanding that "political" rhetoric need
not be limited to "public" address. Robin Lakoff (1990) explains that there
are at least two kinds of "power-oriented discourse." Macropolitical dis
course refers to relations between established groups nations, religions, rac
es, and institutions, for instance. Micropolitical discourse "involves the de
velopment and use of strategies that create and enhance power differences
among individuals"(p. 21). Dialectical-Bilateral-Feminist criteria could guide
criticism of the rhetoric of both macropolitical public address and micropolitical interpersonal communication.
Finally, in extending such analyses to interpersonal relations, we might
want to consider beginning with our own communication practices. While
feminists have reminded us that "the personal is political" we must also
understand that the political is personal. We construct, in our own lives, a
slice of the social world. When we confront others monologically, we re-produce a dominant ideology. When we engage equals dialogically, we
embody "other" ways of being. Behaving bilaterally challenges "an oppres
sive system simply because it models an alternative to the system" (Foss &
Griffin, 1995, p. 17).

Those working at the intersections of argumentation studies, communi
cation ethics, and feminist theory have a unique opportunity to influence the
direction of communication studies and the evolution of human values.

Communication scholars must not underestimate our potential to influence
cultural formations (Meadows, 1990; Shepherd, 1992). As feminist foresister
Gloria Steinem (1983) concludes:
A feminist assault on the politics of talking and listening, is a radical act. It's
a way of transforming the cultural vessel in which both instant communi
cation and long-term anthropological change are carried, (p. 190)
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